During provisioning phase, what's a reliable way to distinguish between requests coming from Azure ActiveDirectory and Okta?
We're implementing SCIM and SSO in our app. To aid user UX, we would like to render better errors to users, for cases when they would like to log in using wrong SSO provider. For example, if users were provisioned from Okta and attempts to log in using Azure (don't know why would he do that – but still), we'd like to tell them to use Okta instead.
It appears as if I am missing something obvious, as am I failing to locate relevant topics (e.g. source / origin of the server) in the SCIM 2.0 protocol, as well as Azure/Okta documentation.
That would be your SCIM connector's responsibility to capture originating call by IP to understand which system created this user. So you need to look at that direction, to add an additional attribute in your system depending on the SCIM caller's IP
Related
I have an existing IdentityServer4 installation that is used to federate users between things like Google & Microsoft into a single login identity. In my situation, there are no local user credentials/passwords. Just the identity with an associated external provider. I'm trying to migrate to using Azure B2C and am hitting some roadblocks.
I've found that if I use the same ClientId and ClientSecret that IdentityServer is configured with, then I get the same IDs for users when signing in via an external identity provider. Which is great because I need them to be the same in order to try and migrate accounts over by reading them from the existing MSSQL database, and importing into Azure B2C using MS Graph.
I need to allow both Microsoft work accounts, as well as personal ones. So I need to use custom policies to allow for a multi-tenant configuration, since the built in provider doesn't support this.
However as soon as I flip my implementation over from the built in user flows and provider, to using custom policies, I don't get the expected issuerAssignedId anymore. Originally, the IDs looked something like AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAHGFdaj94jfdsgjifdh4ngd (made up, but you get the idea). Now with the custom policies, the issuerAssignedId being recorded in the B2C user looks like a GUID. So not just a different value, but a total different format. Am I missing something here? What would happen if someone has an fully operational AzureB2C install with built in functionality, and later identified a need to move to custom policies. How would users ever be able to look into their existing accounts with an external identity provider?
My TechnicalProfile for the multi-tenant sign is is essentially copy/pasted from their documentation, so I'm not sure what the deal is here?
I am working on one API which will be exposed to a couple of external clients. And I would like to limit access to my API and let only trusted 3rd parties access my API. I have found that Azure API Management provides subscription keys, which can be used to protect API - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory-b2c/secure-api-management?tabs=app-reg-ga
Moreover, I see that I can connect my API to Azure AD - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/api-management/api-management-howto-protect-backend-with-aad, which might be useful if I want to restrict access based on roles and types of external systems (for example some external systems will have one role that allows using some additional features)
Could you please help me to understand all other cases when I must use Azure AD instead of subscription keys? And can I use them together?
I also would like to understand which approach is the best for me if you want to give access to the client apps (browser, mobile apps and etc.). As I understand, Azure AD B2C can be the best option here
For your requirement, if APIM is not necessary (you do not need to configure the exposed url of your api by APIM), I suggest you to just use Azure AD to protect your api. You can refer to this document.
If APIM is necessary, and your requirements do not need to limit multiple permissions for different role to access the api (in other words, you just want client can/can't access the api). You can implement it just by subscription key as you mentioned in your question.
If APIM is necessary, and your requirements need to provide different permissions for different roles to access the api, you can do it as the second document link you provided. You can validate the roles or other claims of access token to provide different permissions to client.
I have successfully configured qn Azure AD App Registration, allowing a client_credentials based OAuth 2.0 flow to work. This allows a third party application to access Microsoft Graph API. The app has "Calendar.Read" permission. Meaning the app can pretty much read any of the calendars (including CEO's).
I now have a conversation with security. What is out there in the Microsoft world, that I can use to lock down usage of API access via this Application Permission? Is there ability to do things like:
Restrict IP ranges the App can be accessed from?
Restrict users that can access the App? (However in Client_credentials, there is no user context)
Log traffic / activity happening via the App?
The only thing i can think of now is to say the Redirect URL configuration on the app means, no other application can get an access token using the Client_credentials, even if the application id & passkey get compromised
Any advice on further security controls that can be put in place?
Restricting access: You would need to do this in your application. The Client Credential flow doesn't allow for restricting what users as you point out. However there is nothing stopping you from adding user authentication to your application, possibly using a delegated graph auth flow to determine who they are.
IP Ranges: This is not possible currently.
Logging Traffic: This is not possible on the graph side currently, however you could/should log traffic on your applications side.
Redirect urls will not help you because they are not used int eh client credential flow.
In general application only auth (client credential flow) + a broad authorization scope is very powerful, but must be managed correctly. You don't inadvertently want to build a totally new users/permissions model over the top of the graph :)
There are very few options available currently available to offer these controls at token issuance (in Azure AD) or at API access (in Microsoft Graph). However, you can achieve similar results by carefully managing access to the app's credentials. Here are a couple steps you can take (not exhaustive):
App credentials: keep them secret, keep them safe
Use Key Vault. You can configure many of the restrictions you mention for access to data in Key Vault, including IP ranges and which users access. Key Vault also offers auditing of access to secrets. Don't forget to also be careful about which users have management access to the Key Vault (e.g. other users with access to the same Azure subscription).
Use certificates (public/private key pair), rather than client secrets (passwords), to authenticate the app. People tend to manage certificates much more carefully than they manage shared passwords, and developers are much less likely to hard-code the secret into scripts/code.
Be careful and deliberate about which users can manage the app's credentials
This is often overlooked. A user (or another app) who can access existing credentials, or add a new authorized credential to an app can act as the app and (mis)use all the permissions the app has been granted. This includes:
Users (and apps) in the "Company Administrator", "Application Administrator" and "Cloud Application Administrator" directory roles.
Users who are set as owners of the app registration (Application object) and enterprise app (ServicePrincipal object) for the app.
Users (or systems) who have access to the server or service the application resides on (which will have, or have access to, the credentials).
For all of these cases, ensure this is the smallest possible number of users, and they actually have a legitimate need. For users who do need access, wherever possible enforce just-in-time, time-limited access (not persistent access), such as with Azure AD Privileged Identity Management, for time-bound, just-in-time access for Azure AD directory roles and Azure resources.
I'm building a service where each user has a calendar, I want to sync users 365 calendar events into their calendar, the tricky part seems to be, that this should be done repeatable by background job on the server, to keep them in sync.
I feel like I've read a bible of documentation from Microsoft, but still gotten nowhere. I eventually stumbled upon this article https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols-oauth-client-creds which allows a server to query the graph api, on behalf of users. This is exactly what I want.
Having created a Azure account, and Active Directory service, I found that only users within the tenant can use this, which makes it rather useless, requiring to add users manually from azure panel.
AADSTS50020: User account 'm#****.com' from identity provider 'live.com' does not exist in tenant 'Default Directory' and cannot access the application 'c0193dea-5145-430a-9c90-325f1229a1fc' in that tenant. The account needs to be added as an external user in the tenant first. Sign out and sign in again with a different Azure Active Directory user account.
So I'm back at square one, how can I achieve what I described?
I'm not looking for a code implementation, merely a description of how to navigate the monstrosity of Microsoft.
Thank you
Update: Accordingly to Marc link. I tried to flick the multi tenant option, and change the endpoint to use common instead of tenant id. Sadly i'm still getting the same error.
You cannot sign-in to AAD with a non-AAD account using the v1 Endpoint. If you want to use a consumer Microsoft Account (#outlook.com, #hotmail.com, #live.com) then you need to use the Converged Auth model provided by the v2 Endpoint.
I have a walkthrough for the v2 Endpoint that you might find helpful: Microsoft v2 Endpoint Primer. It is similar to the v1 Endpoint but you'll need to register via https://apps.dev.microsoft.com rather than the Azure Portal. Also, v2 apps use Scopes instead of Resources and are multi-tenant out of the box.
This is a broad a question for Stack Overflow. That said, you're incorrect about Azure AD. It is absolutely not limited to a single-tenant. You do however need to register it as a multi-tenant application:
How to sign in any Azure Active Directory (AD) user using the multi-tenant application pattern
New to Azure AD... So please don't be too harsh if this is off target. :-)
Technology Stack - Latest Angular 2 with C# Middle tier and latest .Net Framework.
Ideally, What we want to do is use Azure AD B2C to store user credentials and to do the authentication - but we want our 'own' forms on our site to do the login Forms capture and logging - then pass the credentials through an API (REST?) Call (using MS Graph SDK?) to Azure AD B2C and then check the call return for the Authorization content message.
Couple of reasons - control of the application flow, Logging and the "flickering of the URL" (i.e. going from our site URL to login.microsoft... URL and then back to our sites URL).
Is this doable without doing a hack?
Thank you in advance for your help and patience!
You are looking for the "Resource Owner Password Credentials".
This is not currently supported for Azure AD B2C, but you can give user feedback to the B2C team that you want this through the Azure Feedback Forum: Add support for Resource Owner Password Credentials flow in Azure AD B2C and headless authentication in Microsoft Authentication Library
You should also see updates at that location if and when they implement this feature.
The resource owner password credentials flow is now in preview.
In Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) B2C, the following options are
supported:
Native Client: User interaction during authentication happens when
code runs on a user-side device. The device can be a mobile
application that's running in a native operating system, such as
Android, or running in a browser, such as JavaScript.
Public client flow: Only user credentials, gathered by an application, are sent in
the API call. The credentials of the application are not sent.
Add new claims: The ID token contents can be changed to add new claims.
The following flows are not supported:
Server-to-server: The identity protection system needs a reliable IP
address gathered from the caller (the native client) as part of the
interaction. In a server-side API call, only the server’s IP address
is used. If a dynamic threshold of failed authentications is exceeded,
the identity protection system may identify a repeated IP address as
an attacker.
Confidential client flow: The application client ID is
validated, but the application secret is not validated.
From here.
Note that one disadvantage of doing what you're requesting is precisely that you can do "login forms capture and logging", so your application has a chance to see the credentials and perhaps take copies of them; thus your users have to trust you to behave.
The normal web-based flow means that your application doesn't need to be trusted; it never even sees the password at all.