Is there a way to detect and monitor that a service principal is only being used from a specific set of IP addresses? I do not want to IP restrict my entire directory. I have premium AAD and I think it has features that I might be able to utilized but I cannot do much testing. I’m currently struggling on how to detect if a SP has been jeopardized and how to prevent it.
If you want to use IP as conditions for the user to sign-in, you could use Conditional Access to make it. But the Conditional Access is used for the entire tenant.
And the features of Azure Active Directory Premium includes:
Company branding
Group-based application access
Self-service password reset
Self-service group management
Advanced security reports and alerts
Multi-Factor Authentication
Forefront Identity Manager (FIM)
Enterprise SLA of 99.9%
For the details, please read here.
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I have registered an app in AAD and as a admin I want to provide permission for user to read or access the data of particular group list not all group available in my MS team account. How can be achieve this any idea?
No. Azure AD app doesn't provide such a feature that scopes Microsoft Graph application permissions to specific Microsoft Teams/Groups.
The client credential flow is used to as an authorization grant typically when the client is acting on its own behalf. When you give Group.Read.All or Files.Read.All or other similar application permissions, it means the client has access to all the files/groups across the entire tenant.
You can achieve this by implement the business logic in your code. For example, providing a configuration file which includes the particular groups'/teams' object ids. And then restrict the access for users to only these groups/teams by checking if the object ids (which users are trying to access) are in the configuration file.
At the moment I have setup a build pipeline that pulls an artifact from Azure artifacts.
Authentication is done using a Personal Access Token.
Since a couple of days now, my pipeline errors out with the message:
VS403463: The conditional access policy defined by your Azure Active Directory administrator has failed.
Looking into the debug logs I can see the call that is made
Now doing this call from my local machine, this works but ONLY if I am within the network of my Organisation (if I run it from home, it does not work)
Looking at the pipeline, it mentions that it gets an agent "from the cloud".
I assume this agent is not within our network.
Is there any way we can setup Azure Devops such that we can still access Azure artifacts from a cloud build agent whilst this conditional access policy is in place?
Your administrator might set the Conditional Access policies to block the ip outside the trusted IP range to access your organization resources. Check the Common signals Conditional Access takes.
You can try connecting to your organization network over VPN when you work from home. Or asking your administrator to add your home ip to the trusted ip range.
You can also try disabling "Enable Azure Active Directory Conditional Access Policy Validation" in your azure devops organization setting page. Check the steps here.
Check here to learn more about conditional access policy. Hope you find it helpful.
We are using a third-party IT provider that handles our network administration and domain accounts, but as part of moving to a different office and setting up new infrastructure, we are considering dropping that and using Azure Active Directory only.
Researching the topic online seems to indicate that Azure AD is not a complete replacement for on-premises Active Directory, as things like local resource access and group policies outside of Azure would be missing. However, we are moving towards using Azure for most things (file storage, etc), so that should be fine if we still have that functionality there.
Before finalizing the decision to go in that direction, we just need to be certain of a few things:
1) Is there a way to create a new account in Azure AD so that it can be used to login from any machine in the office, without having to create it locally first and then connect the two?
2) Is there a way to sync user data, such as user/desktop files, across any devices the account is used to log into?
3) Is it possible to have an office printer configured in Azure so that it can be used with an Azure AD login, completely independent on any on-premises setup (i.e, not Hybrid Cloud Print, which seems to require an on-premises network/AD to be joined with Azure AD)?
The goal is to be able to log in and work from any internet-connected device, whether in the office or at home, without needing to use a VPN and/or remote desktop, and forego on-premises AD administration.
This is possible as long as the device is joined to Azure AD. Once the device is joined to Azure AD, then newly created cloud-only users can also login to the devices.
Ref: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-azure-ad-join
Enterprise state roaming should help in this aspect. It might not cover everything you are looking for but the important app-specific data and user settings are synced.
Ref: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/devices/enterprise-state-roaming-overview
There is no direct solution from Microsoft for pure cloud scenarios. There are few 3rd party services offered for this.
Ref: https://appsource.microsoft.com/en-us/product/azure/printix.64182edf-4951-40d5-91c8-733e1c896b70
Hope this helps.
What is the difference/relation between ADAM, Active Directory, LDAP, ADFS, Windows Identity, cardspace and which server (Windows 2003, Windows 2008) uses what?
Active Directory is a server component for administrating windows domains and storing related informations like details about users. It provides implementations of the network protocols LDAP, DNS, CIFS and Kerberos. It's part of Windows Server 2003 as well as Windows Server 2008 with some modifications in the latter case.
ADAM was somewhat like the little brother of Active Directory. It only contained an implementation of LDAP. With Windows Server 2008 it was renamed to LDS, Lightweight Directory Services. ADAM/LDS can also be installed on non-server versions of Windows.
LDAP is a protocol for administrating the data of a directory service. Data within a directory services are stored in a hierarchical manner, a tree. Entries within that tree can contain a set of attributes where each has a name and a value. They are mostly used for storing user related informations like usernames, passwords, email addresses and so on, as there are standardized schemas for this purpose and it's widely supported by applications.
ADFS is a technology which enables Single Sign-On for users of web applications within an Identity Federation. In a very short form: Imagine two organizations which have their user data stored within an active directory. Now each organization wants to give the users of the other organization access to its web applications, but with the restriction that the user data itself should neither be copied nor be fully accessible to the other organization. Thats the kind of problem ADFS can solve. May require an hour of reading & researching before fully understood.
Just to fill in the gaps above:
ADFS is an example of a STS (Security Token Service). STS's can be configured to have a trust relationship with each other. Imagine you have a company which only has internal users and they want to expand to external users. That means that all external users have to register, get a user name, password etc. Perhaps the company doesn't want to store all this stuff. They realise that most of their external users already have an OpenId account. So they federate (trust) their ADFS with an STS that accepts OpenId credentials.
When an external user wants to access the company website, they are asked what kind of user they are via a drop down. They select OpenID. They are then taken to the OpenId site where they authenticate. The user is then redirected back to the company ADFS with a signed token which states that OpenId has authenticated the user. Since there is a trust relationship, the ADFS accepts the authentication and allows the user access to the web site.
None of the OpenId credentials are stored by the company.
Effectively, you have outsourced authentication.
ADFS currently runs on Windows Server 2008 R2.
For Windows Identity (in the context of ADFS) I assume you are asking about Windows Identity Foundation (WIF). This is essentially a set of .NET classes that are added to a project using VS that makes the application "claims aware". There is a VS tool called FedUtil that maps an application to a STS and describes the claims that will be provided. (A claim is an attribute e.g. name, DOB etc.) When a user accesses the application, WIF redirects the user to the mapped STS where the user logs in. WIF then provides the application with a set of claims. Based on these, the application can alter flows based on the user claims. E.g. only users with a claim type of Role with a value of Editor can alter pages.
WIF can also act as an Access Manager E.g. only Editors can access this page. Other users simply receive an error.
In WIF, an application is referred to as a "Relying Party" (RP).
WIF inside VS requires Vista or Windows 7.
Since STS's can be federated with each other, each STS can provide a group of claims.
E.g. in the example above, the OpenId STS can provide the user's name while the company ADFS can provide information not pertinent to OpenId e.g role in the company.
Cardspace is a mechanism to authenticate via a digital identity e.g. an enabled application can ask you to login by selecting one of your "cards", one of which might be e.g. your personal X509 certificate. The application would then check this against the credentials it has stored.
In February 2011, Microsoft announced that they would no longer be developing the Windows CardSpace product.
I believe Windows auth is the best practice to use to connect to SQL DB. I am hear talking about application user account..
Is it true that SQL auth is only great for multiple role apps and window auth is only good for single role app? I never heard that windows auth with muitple role os only good for smaill internal app?
multiple Windows logins = multiple connections = no pooling = poor scaling?
The problem with using Windows auth for a web application is that many web applications store their application users' credentials in the same SQL database that is used for other application data.
So you have a chicken-and-egg problem. You can't authenticate the user before connecting to the database, and you can't connect to the database without authenticating the user.
It should be possible to use Windows authentication, and then also have application-specific attributes of the user stored inside the database. But most people find this cumbersome to administer, and also limiting to portability of the application.
For example, if one of the feature of the application allows users to change their own password, then the process running your web application needs the privilege to alter a Windows password, which may mean that the application needs to run with Administrator privileges.
If you let the application manage user ID for the context of the application, then to change a user's password is just an SQL operation, and your application is in charge of enforcing security for that.
I'm not sure what you mean by single-role and multi-role app. I have built apps before where there are multiple SQL Server Database Roles, each with a Windows Domain Group of users allowed in that role. So user management is completely within Active Directory, with a 1-1 correspondence between the Domain Group and the Database Role.
We typically did not manage the security within the application itself except obviously declaratively during the database creation where each object was granted access by particular roles according to the design. Typically, in a simple case, we relied on db_datareader role being granted for general usage to non-specific groups of users like database and network administrators for troubleshooting or report-writers or business analysts for ad hoc reporting. Actual users of the app would be granted execute on the relevant SPs to be able to modify any data (so all data creation or modification was through SPs and only explicit members of the ThisAppsUsers AD group could do it). Any advanced SPs (say, merging or deleting accounts) would only be accessible by ThisAppsAdmins AD group. And that was usually all we needed for moderate-sized applications. For more complex functionality, it was also possible to interrogate AD directly for custom attributes (user is an admin only for this customer account but for others is just a user)
This same technique can be used with SQL Server logins, but of course the individual SQL Server logins have to be added to the database roles, and you don't have the richness of AD and have to build some kind of directory service into your database.
The ability to even use AD may not be possible for many applications, so in that case, the security architecture would obviously have to cater to that model.
using the integratedSecurity=true option for SQL JDBC , by including the JDBC auth .dll, should give you database connectivity without authenticating...