Related
what I did is:
1. sudo rm -rf /root/.debug/
2. compile program with -g -O2 -fno-omit-frame-pointer
3. run the program and get the pid
4. sudo perf record -F 2000 -a -s -g -p $pid sleep 15
5. sudo perf report
then I get a tiny part of "unknown", like
- 2.50% 0.00% postgres [unknown] [k] 0000000000000000
- 0
1.12% _int_malloc ▒
0.79% _IO_vsnprintf
looks this is due to libc 'malloc' call. then I write a program on the same machine to test it.
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
while(1) {
printf("perf record -g -p %d -- sleep 5; perf report\n", getpid());
sleep(1);
void *p = malloc(10);
memset(p, 0, 10);
free(p);
}
return 0;
}
then I did the same thing as above, there is no "unknown" section.
how to explain/fix this?
The [unknown] block in the perf report output refers to the name of the dynamic shared object (DSO). perf report could not resolve the DSO path and hence it prints [unknown]. Per the latest kernel source code tree (which is 5.3.9 at the time of writing), you can see this here.
It is important to know that the determination of the DSO symbols happen with the help of the sampled event address. The function thread__resolve is responsible for doing exactly that. In older kernels, the thread__resolve method had another name - perf_event__preprocess_sample_addr.
Given the snapshot of your output, it looks like the address of the event that was sampled during perf record, is 0. This means that the address could not be resolved at all. It is an address in the kernel space (looking at the symbol [k] 0000000000000000) and perf in your case, could not resolve it.
The comments highlight setting perf_event_paranoid to a suitable value so that you can probe both kernel and user-space events successfully. Setting perf_event_paranoid to a value that allows you to correctly probe events in the kernel space should "be a step" towards correctly resolving the address.
i have this function:
char code[] = "\xeb\x19\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x31\xd2\x31\xc9\xb0\x04\xb3\x01\x59\xb2\x05\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\xb0\x01\x31\xdb\xcd\x80\xe8\xe2\xff\xff\xff\x68\x65\x6c\x6c\x6f";
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int (*func)();
func = (int (*)()) code;
(int)(*func)();
}
(this code is from: shellcode tutorial)
so i compiled and execute it, but i only get this message: Speicherzugriffsfehler (Speicherabzug geschrieben).
Why i don't get something back, only this error message?
p.s.: my system is an ubuntu x86 pc. the shellcode should work with it. i compiled it with gcc and with gcc-4.5, both same error...
Your code variable is an array that's part of your program's initialized data (.data) segment. When your program is loaded by the OS, the loader reads and executes the load commands from your executable file. One of those commands is "load the following data (a segment named .data) into memory".
Ordinarily, the .data segment is loaded as a non-executable segment, meaning that the memory there cannot be executed. Therefore, if you try to execute code from there by jumping to it, like you did, then it will crash with a segmentation fault.
There are a couple of ways to work around this. You can tell the linker to make the .data segment executable (not a good idea). You can tell the compiler to put the code variable into the .text segment instead (the segment used for all of your program's regular code). You can tell the compiler and linker to make a new executable segment and put code into that. All of these are tricky.
The best solution, is to specifically allocate your own executable memory at runtime and copy the shellcode into that. That completely avoids any potential compiler/linker issues, although it does add a small runtime penalty. But some OSes don't allow memory to be both writable and executable at the same time; so you'd first have to make it writable, copy the shellcode in, and then make it executable.
The way you control memory permissions at runtime is with the mprotect(2) call. So here's a good way to do it:
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
char shellcode[] = "\xeb\x19\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x31\xd2\x31\xc9\xb0\x04\xb3\x01\x59\xb2\x05\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\xb0\x01\x31\xdb\xcd\x80\xe8\xe2\xff\xff\xff\x68\x65\x6c\x6c\x6f";
// Error checking omitted for expository purposes
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
// Allocate some read-write memory
void *mem = mmap(0, sizeof(shellcode), PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
// Copy the shellcode into the new memory
memcpy(mem, shellcode, sizeof(shellcode));
// Make the memory read-execute
mprotect(mem, sizeof(shellcode), PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC);
// Call the shellcode
int (*func)();
func = (int (*)())mem;
(int)(*func)();
// Now, if we managed to return here, it would be prudent to clean up the memory:
munmap(mem, sizeof(shellcode));
return 0;
}
By default gcc will compile applications as having nonexecutable stacks. What you're seeing is a segmentation violation because your stack is marked nonexecutable but you're trying to execute code on the stack. You can verify by running your application in gdb and checking where it dies, for instance:
=> 0x601060 : jmp 0x60107b
This is the entry point of your shellcode. To make it so it doesn't segfault, you can disable exectstack by doing the following:
gcc -z execstack source.c
I want a simple C method to be able to run hex bytecode on a Linux 64 bit machine. Here's the C program that I have:
char code[] = "\x48\x31\xc0";
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int (*func) ();
func = (int (*)()) code;
(int)(*func)();
printf("%s\n","DONE");
}
The code that I am trying to run ("\x48\x31\xc0") I obtained by writting this simple assembly program (it's not supposed to really do anything)
.text
.globl _start
_start:
xorq %rax, %rax
and then compiling and objdump-ing it to obtain the bytecode.
However, when I run my C program I get a segmentation fault. Any ideas?
Machine code has to be in an executable page. Your char code[] is in the read+write data section, without exec permission, so the code cannot be executed from there.
Here is a simple example of allocating an executable page with mmap:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main ()
{
char code[] = {
0x8D, 0x04, 0x37, // lea eax,[rdi+rsi]
0xC3 // ret
};
int (*sum) (int, int) = NULL;
// allocate executable buffer
sum = mmap (0, sizeof(code), PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
// copy code to buffer
memcpy (sum, code, sizeof(code));
// doesn't actually flush cache on x86, but ensure memcpy isn't
// optimized away as a dead store.
__builtin___clear_cache (sum, sum + sizeof(sum)); // GNU C
// run code
int a = 2;
int b = 3;
int c = sum (a, b);
printf ("%d + %d = %d\n", a, b, c);
}
See another answer on this question for details about __builtin___clear_cache.
Until recent Linux kernel versions (sometime before 5.4), you could simply compile with gcc -z execstack - that would make all pages executable, including read-only data (.rodata), and read-write data (.data) where char code[] = "..." goes.
Now -z execstack only applies to the actual stack, so it currently works only for non-const local arrays. i.e. move char code[] = ... into main.
See Linux default behavior against `.data` section for the kernel change, and Unexpected exec permission from mmap when assembly files included in the project for the old behaviour: enabling Linux's READ_IMPLIES_EXEC process for that program. (In Linux 5.4, that Q&A shows you'd only get READ_IMPLIES_EXEC for a missing PT_GNU_STACK, like a really old binary; modern GCC -z execstack would set PT_GNU_STACK = RWX metadata in the executable, which Linux 5.4 would handle as making only the stack itself executable. At some point before that, PT_GNU_STACK = RWX did result in READ_IMPLIES_EXEC.)
The other option is to make system calls at runtime to copy into an executable page, or change permissions on the page it's in. That's still more complicated than using a local array to get GCC to copy code into executable stack memory.
(I don't know if there's an easy way to enable READ_IMPLIES_EXEC under modern kernels. Having no GNU-stack attribute at all in an ELF binary does that for 32-bit code, but not 64-bit.)
Yet another option is __attribute__((section(".text"))) const char code[] = ...;
Working example: https://godbolt.org/z/draGeh.
If you need the array to be writeable, e.g. for shellcode that inserts some zeros into strings, you could maybe link with ld -N. But probably best to use -z execstack and a local array.
Two problems in the question:
exec permission on the page, because you used an array that will go in the noexec read+write .data section.
your machine code doesn't end with a ret instruction so even if it did run, execution would fall into whatever was next in memory instead of returning.
And BTW, the REX prefix is totally redundant. "\x31\xc0" xor eax,eax has exactly the same effect as xor rax,rax.
You need the page containing the machine code to have execute permission. x86-64 page tables have a separate bit for execute separate from read permission, unlike legacy 386 page tables.
The easiest way to get static arrays to be in read+exec memory was to compile with gcc -z execstack. (Used to make the stack and other sections executable, now only the stack).
Until recently (2018 or 2019), the standard toolchain (binutils ld) would put section .rodata into the same ELF segment as .text, so they'd both have read+exec permission. Thus using const char code[] = "..."; was sufficient for executing manually-specified bytes as data, without execstack.
But on my Arch Linux system with GNU ld (GNU Binutils) 2.31.1, that's no longer the case. readelf -a shows that the .rodata section went into an ELF segment with .eh_frame_hdr and .eh_frame, and it only has Read permission. .text goes in a segment with Read + Exec, and .data goes in a segment with Read + Write (along with the .got and .got.plt). (What's the difference of section and segment in ELF file format)
I assume this change is to make ROP and Spectre attacks harder by not having read-only data in executable pages where sequences of useful bytes could be used as "gadgets" that end with the bytes for a ret or jmp reg instruction.
// TODO: use char code[] = {...} inside main, with -z execstack, for current Linux
// Broken on recent Linux, used to work without execstack.
#include <stdio.h>
// can be non-const if you use gcc -z execstack. static is also optional
static const char code[] = {
0x8D, 0x04, 0x37, // lea eax,[rdi+rsi] // retval = a+b;
0xC3 // ret
};
static const char ret0_code[] = "\x31\xc0\xc3"; // xor eax,eax ; ret
// the compiler will append a 0 byte to terminate the C string,
// but that's fine. It's after the ret.
int main () {
// void* cast is easier to type than a cast to function pointer,
// and in C can be assigned to any other pointer type. (not C++)
int (*sum) (int, int) = (void*)code;
int (*ret0)(void) = (void*)ret0_code;
// run code
int c = sum (2, 3);
return ret0();
}
On older Linux systems: gcc -O3 shellcode.c && ./a.out (Works because of const on global/static arrays)
On Linux before 5.5 (or so) gcc -O3 -z execstack shellcode.c && ./a.out (works because of -zexecstack regardless of where your machine code is stored). Fun fact: gcc allows -zexecstack with no space, but clang only accepts clang -z execstack.
These also work on Windows, where read-only data goes in .rdata instead of .rodata.
The compiler-generated main looks like this (from objdump -drwC -Mintel). You can run it inside gdb and set breakpoints on code and ret0_code
(I actually used gcc -no-pie -O3 -zexecstack shellcode.c hence the addresses near 401000
0000000000401020 <main>:
401020: 48 83 ec 08 sub rsp,0x8 # stack aligned by 16 before a call
401024: be 03 00 00 00 mov esi,0x3
401029: bf 02 00 00 00 mov edi,0x2 # 2 args
40102e: e8 d5 0f 00 00 call 402008 <code> # note the target address in the next page
401033: 48 83 c4 08 add rsp,0x8
401037: e9 c8 0f 00 00 jmp 402004 <ret0_code> # optimized tailcall
Or use system calls to modify page permissions
Instead of compiling with gcc -zexecstack, you can instead use mmap(PROT_EXEC) to allocate new executable pages, or mprotect(PROT_EXEC) to change existing pages to executable. (Including pages holding static data.) You also typically want at least PROT_READ and sometimes PROT_WRITE, of course.
Using mprotect on a static array means you're still executing the code from a known location, maybe making it easier to set a breakpoint on it.
On Windows you can use VirtualAlloc or VirtualProtect.
Telling the compiler that data is executed as code
Normally compilers like GCC assume that data and code are separate. This is like type-based strict aliasing, but even using char* doesn't make it well-defined to store into a buffer and then call that buffer as a function pointer.
In GNU C, you also need to use __builtin___clear_cache(buf, buf + len) after writing machine code bytes to a buffer, because the optimizer doesn't treat dereferencing a function pointer as reading bytes from that address. Dead-store elimination can remove the stores of machine code bytes into a buffer, if the compiler proves that the store isn't read as data by anything. https://codegolf.stackexchange.com/questions/160100/the-repetitive-byte-counter/160236#160236 and https://godbolt.org/g/pGXn3B has an example where gcc really does do this optimization, because gcc "knows about" malloc.
(And on non-x86 architectures where I-cache isn't coherent with D-cache, it actually will do any necessary cache syncing. On x86 it's purely a compile-time optimization blocker and doesn't expand to any instructions itself.)
Re: the weird name with three underscores: It's the usual __builtin_name pattern, but name is __clear_cache.
My edit on #AntoineMathys's answer added this.
In practice GCC/clang don't "know about" mmap(MAP_ANONYMOUS) the way they know about malloc. So in practice the optimizer will assume that the memcpy into the buffer might be read as data by the non-inline function call through the function pointer, even without __builtin___clear_cache(). (Unless you declared the function type as __attribute__((const)).)
On x86, where I-cache is coherent with data caches, having the stores happen in asm before the call is sufficient for correctness. On other ISAs, __builtin___clear_cache() will actually emit special instructions as well as ensuring the right compile-time ordering.
It's good practice to include it when copying code into a buffer because it doesn't cost performance, and stops hypothetical future compilers from breaking your code. (e.g. if they do understand that mmap(MAP_ANONYMOUS) gives newly-allocated anonymous memory that nothing else has a pointer to, just like malloc.)
With current GCC, I was able to provoke GCC into really doing an optimization we don't want by using __attribute__((const)) to tell the optimizer sum() is a pure function (that only reads its args, not global memory). GCC then knows sum() can't read the result of the memcpy as data.
With another memcpy into the same buffer after the call, GCC does dead-store elimination into just the 2nd store after the call. This results in no store before the first call so it executes the 00 00 add [rax], al bytes, segfaulting.
// demo of a problem on x86 when not using __builtin___clear_cache
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main ()
{
char code[] = {
0x8D, 0x04, 0x37, // lea eax,[rdi+rsi]
0xC3 // ret
};
__attribute__((const)) int (*sum) (int, int) = NULL;
// copy code to executable buffer
sum = mmap (0,sizeof(code),PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANON,-1,0);
memcpy (sum, code, sizeof(code));
//__builtin___clear_cache(sum, sum + sizeof(code));
int c = sum (2, 3);
//printf ("%d + %d = %d\n", a, b, c);
memcpy(sum, (char[]){0x31, 0xc0, 0xc3, 0}, 4); // xor-zero eax, ret, padding for a dword store
//__builtin___clear_cache(sum, sum + 4);
return sum(2,3);
}
Compiled on the Godbolt compiler explorer with GCC9.2 -O3
main:
push rbx
xor r9d, r9d
mov r8d, -1
mov ecx, 34
mov edx, 7
mov esi, 4
xor edi, edi
sub rsp, 16
call mmap
mov esi, 3
mov edi, 2
mov rbx, rax
call rax # call before store
mov DWORD PTR [rbx], 12828721 # 0xC3C031 = xor-zero eax, ret
add rsp, 16
pop rbx
ret # no 2nd call, CSEd away because const and same args
Passing different args would have gotten another call reg, but even with __builtin___clear_cache the two sum(2,3) calls can CSE. __attribute__((const)) doesn't respect changes to the machine code of a function. Don't do it. It's safe if you're going to JIT the function once and then call many times, though.
Uncommenting the first __clear_cache results in
mov DWORD PTR [rax], -1019804531 # lea; ret
call rax
mov DWORD PTR [rbx], 12828721 # xor-zero; ret
... still CSE and use the RAX return value
The first store is there because of __clear_cache and the sum(2,3) call. (Removing the first sum(2,3) call does let dead-store elimination happen across the __clear_cache.)
The second store is there because the side-effect on the buffer returned by mmap is assumed to be important, and that's the final value main leaves.
Godbolt's ./a.out option to run the program still seems to always fail (exit status of 255); maybe it sandboxes JITing? It works on my desktop with __clear_cache and crashes without.
mprotect on a page holding existing C variables.
You can also give a single existing page read+write+exec permission. This is an alternative to compiling with -z execstack
You don't need __clear_cache on a page holding read-only C variables because there's no store to optimize away. You would still need it for initializing a local buffer (on the stack). Otherwise GCC will optimize away the initializer for this private buffer that a non-inline function call definitely doesn't have a pointer to. (Escape analysis). It doesn't consider the possibility that the buffer might hold the machine code for the function unless you tell it that via __builtin___clear_cache.
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <stdint.h>
// can be non-const if you want, we're using mprotect
static const char code[] = {
0x8D, 0x04, 0x37, // lea eax,[rdi+rsi] // retval = a+b;
0xC3 // ret
};
static const char ret0_code[] = "\x31\xc0\xc3";
int main () {
// void* cast is easier to type than a cast to function pointer,
// and in C can be assigned to any other pointer type. (not C++)
int (*sum) (int, int) = (void*)code;
int (*ret0)(void) = (void*)ret0_code;
// hard-coding x86's 4k page size for simplicity.
// also assume that `code` doesn't span a page boundary and that ret0_code is in the same page.
uintptr_t page = (uintptr_t)code & -4095ULL; // round down
mprotect((void*)page, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC|PROT_WRITE); // +write in case the page holds any writeable C vars that would crash later code.
// run code
int c = sum (2, 3);
return ret0();
}
I used PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC|PROT_WRITE in this example so it works regardless of where your variable is. If it was a local on the stack and you left out PROT_WRITE, call would fail after making the stack read only when it tried to push a return address.
Also, PROT_WRITE lets you test shellcode that self-modifies, e.g. to edit zeros into its own machine code, or other bytes it was avoiding.
$ gcc -O3 shellcode.c # without -z execstack
$ ./a.out
$ echo $?
0
$ strace ./a.out
...
mprotect(0x55605aa3f000, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC) = 0
exit_group(0) = ?
+++ exited with 0 +++
If I comment out the mprotect, it does segfault with recent versions of GNU Binutils ld which no longer put read-only constant data into the same ELF segment as the .text section.
If I did something like ret0_code[2] = 0xc3;, I would need __builtin___clear_cache(ret0_code+2, ret0_code+2) after that to make sure the store wasn't optimized away, but if I don't modify the static arrays then it's not needed after mprotect. It is needed after mmap+memcpy or manual stores, because we want to execute bytes that have been written in C (with memcpy).
You need to include the assembly in-line via a special compiler directive so that it'll properly end up in a code segment. See this guide, for example: http://www.ibiblio.org/gferg/ldp/GCC-Inline-Assembly-HOWTO.html
Your machine code may be all right, but your CPU objects.
Modern CPUs manage memory in segments. In normal operation, the operating system loads a new program into a program-text segment and sets up a stack in a data segment. The operating system tells the CPU never to run code in a data segment. Your code is in code[], in a data segment. Thus the segfault.
This will take some effort.
Your code variable is stored in the .data section of your executable:
$ readelf -p .data exploit
String dump of section '.data':
[ 10] H1À
H1À is the value of your variable.
The .data section is not executable:
$ readelf -S exploit
There are 30 section headers, starting at offset 0x1150:
Section Headers:
[Nr] Name Type Address Offset
Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align
[...]
[24] .data PROGBITS 0000000000601010 00001010
0000000000000014 0000000000000000 WA 0 0 8
All 64-bit processors I'm familiar with support non-executable pages natively in the pagetables. Most newer 32-bit processors (the ones that support PAE) provide enough extra space in their pagetables for the operating system to emulate hardware non-executable pages. You'll need to run either an ancient OS or an ancient processor to get a .data section marked executable.
Because these are just flags in the executable, you ought to be able to set the X flag through some other mechanism, but I don't know how to do so. And your OS might not even let you have pages that are both writable and executable.
You may need to set the page executable before you may call it.
On MS-Windows, see the VirtualProtect -function.
URL: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa366898%28v=vs.85%29.aspx
Sorry, I couldn't follow above examples which are complicated.
So, I created an elegant solution for executing hex code from C.
Basically, you could use asm and .word keywords to place your instructions in hex format.
See below example:
asm volatile(".rept 1024\n"
CNOP
".endr\n");
where CNOP is defined as below:
#define ".word 0x00010001 \n"
Basically, c.nop instruction was not supported by my current assembler. So, I defined CNOP as the hex equivalent of c.nop with proper syntax and used inside asm, with which I was aware of.
.rept <NUM> .endr will basically, repeat the instruction NUM times.
This solution is working and verified.
Each program has a main() and the program execution starts from there. Is it possible to write a program without main()and make another function as the entry point? If so, can any one please tell me how can that be done? I am using Linux?
If you're compiling with gcc, specifying -e <symbol> option will let you change the entry point to a function symbol().
You can do this in a portable way, simply by including this header file in your main program:
int nomDePlume(int argc, char *argv[]);
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { return nomDePlume(argc, argv); }
Then provide your own variant of main:
int nomDePlume(int argc, char *argv[]) {
weaveYourMagic();
return 42;
}
That doesn't actually change the entry point of the executable (something that's very much implementation specific) but it does let you call your program entry point whatever you wish (within the bounds of legal identifiers, of course).
If you don't want a main at all (even in a header file), it becomes a little tricky.
That's because the entry pount for an executable generally isn't main - there's quite a bit of activity happening before main is called, to do with environment setup and other things (and some tear-down stuff after main exits, such as your atexit handlers).
In other words, while the main function may be where your C program starts, that's not the same thing as where your executable starts.
As one example, in Linux, the ELF executable format contains an entry point address in the e_entry field of a header block, and that's where the program loader jumps to when it's ready to run the executable.
What usually happens to set this up is that you link (implicitly) with some start-up code like crt0 and the linker populates the e_entry field with the address of a known symbol. An example of which is (from that link, with comments slightly modified):
.text
.globl _start
_start: # Entry point known to linker.
xor %ebp, %ebp # RBP <- 0, mark end of stack frames.
mov (%rsp), %edi # Get argc from stack (implicitly
# zero-extended to 64-bit).
lea 8(%rsp), %rsi # Take address of argv from stack.
lea 16(%rsp,%rdi,8), %rdx # Take address of envp from stack.
xor %eax, %eax # Per ABI and compatibility with icc.
call main # Three args %edi/%rsi/%rdx (first
# two are C standard).
mov %eax, %edi # Effectively set up _exit(main()).
xor %eax, %eax # Per ABI and compatibility with icc.
call _exit # Terminate the program.
You can see there the start-up and tear-down stuff happening on either side of the main call, and therein lies a possible solution for you.
By creating your own crt0, replacing the text main with whatever you want to call, and ensuring the linker uses your crt0 rather than the default one, you can have it call whatever function you want to provide as the main one.
However, it's not really clear what you gain from being able to use an arbitrarily-named main function, other than to obtain job security or annoy your colleague when they can't find where your code begins :-)
If it's an educational thing, that's fine - I just wouldn't do this in a real-world situation.
There is a solution for build executable shared library that you can build a program use another function as entry point.
The code looks like:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
const char __invoke_dynamic_linker[] __attribute__ ((section (".interp")))
= "/lib/ld-linux.so.2";
void fun()
{
printf("This is fun./n");
exit(0);
}
Then build your program as an shared library and specify func as entry point：
$ gcc -fpic -shared -o fun.so -Wl,-e,fun fun.c
$ ./fun.so
The problem of this way is that the func can't have the normal arguments as we have in main function, this is because we don't have the c library to initialize the main arguments stuff.
I'll explain:
Let's say I'm interested in replacing the rand() function used by a certain application.
So I attach gdb to this process and make it load my custom shared library (which has a customized rand() function):
call (int) dlopen("path_to_library/asdf.so")
This would place the customized rand() function inside the process' memory. However, at this point the symbol rand will still point to the default rand() function. Is there a way to make gdb point the symbol to the new rand() function, forcing the process to use my version?
I must say I'm also not allowed to use the LD_PRELOAD (linux) nor DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES (mac os x) methods for this, because they allow code injection only in the beginning of the program execution.
The application that I would like to replace rand(), starts several threads and some of them start new processes, and I'm interested in injecting code on one of these new processes. As I mentioned above, GDB is great for this purpose because it allows code injection into a specific process.
I followed this post and this presentation and came up with the following set of gdb commands for OSX with x86-64 executable, which can be loaded with -x option when attaching to the process:
set $s = dyld_stub_rand
set $p = ($s+6+*(int*)($s+2))
call (void*)dlsym((void*)dlopen("myrand.dylib"), "my_rand")
set *(void**)$p = my_rand
c
The magic is in set $p = ... command. dyld_stub_rand is a 6-byte jump instruction. Jump offset is at dyld_stub_rand+2 (4 bytes). This is a $rip-relative jump, so add offset to what $rip would be at this point (right after the instruction, dyld_stub_rand+6).
This points to a symbol table entry, which should be either real rand or dynamic linker routine to load it (if it was never called). It is then replaced by my_rand.
Sometimes gdb will pick up dyld_stub_rand from libSystem or another shared library, if that happens, unload them first with remove-symbol-file before running other commands.
This question intrigued me, so I did a little research. What you are looking for is a 'dll injection'. You write a function to replace some library function, put it in a .so, and tell ld to preload your dll. I just tried it out and it worked great! I realize this doesn't really answer your question in relation to gdb, but I think it offers a viable workaround.
For a gdb-only solution, see my other solution.
// -*- compile-command: "gcc -Wall -ggdb -o test test.c"; -*-
// test.c
#include "stdio.h"
#include "stdlib.h"
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
//should print a fairly random number...
printf("Super random number: %d\n", rand());
return 0;
}
/ -*- compile-command: "gcc -Wall -fPIC -shared my_rand.c -o my_rand.so"; -*-
//my_rand.c
int rand(void)
{
return 42;
}
compile both files, then run:
LD_PRELOAD="./my_rand.so" ./test
Super random number: 42
I have a new solution, based on the new original constraints. (I am not deleting my first answer, as others may find it useful.)
I have been doing a bunch of research, and I think it would work with a bit more fiddling.
In your .so rename your replacement rand function, e.g my_rand
Compile everything and load up gdb
Use info functions to find the address of rand in the symbol table
Use dlopen then dlsym to load the function into memory and get its address
call (int) dlopen("my_rand.so", 1) -> -val-
call (unsigned int) dlsym(-val-, "my_rand") -> my_rand_addr
-the tricky part- Find the hex code of a jumpq 0x*my_rand_addr* instruction
Use set {int}*rand_addr* = *my_rand_addr* to change symbol table instruction
Continue execution: now whenever rand is called, it will jump to my_rand instead
This is a bit complicated, and very round-about, but I'm pretty sure it would work. The only thing I haven't accomplished yet is creating the jumpq instruction code. Everything up until that point works fine.
I'm not sure how to do this in a running program, but perhaps LD_PRELOAD will work for you. If you set this environment variable to a list of shared objects, the runtime loader will load the shared object early in the process and allow the functions in it to take precedence over others.
LD_PRELOAD=path_to_library/asdf.so path/to/prog
You do have to do this before you start the process but you don't have to rebuild the program.
Several of the answers here and the code injection article you linked to in your answer cover chunks of what I consider the optimal gdb-oriented solution, but none of them pull it all together or cover all the points. The code-expression of the solution is a bit long, so here's a summary of the important steps:
Load the code to inject. Most of the answers posted here use what I consider the best approach -- call dlopen() in the inferior process to link in a shared library containing the injected code. In the article you linked to the author instead loaded a relocatable object file and hand-linked it against the inferior. This is quite frankly insane -- relocatable objects are not "ready-to-run" and include relocations even for internal references. And hand-linking is tedious and error-prone -- far simpler to let the real runtime dynamic linker do the work. This does mean getting libdl into the process in the first place, but there are many options for doing that.
Create a detour. Most of the answers posted here so far have involved locating the PLT entry for the function of interest, using that to find the matching GOT entry, then modifying the GOT entry to point to your injected function. This is fine up to a point, but certain linker features -- e.g., use of dlsym -- can circumvent the GOT and provide direct access to the function of interest. The only way to be certain of intercepting all calls to a particular function is overwrite the initial instructions of that function's code in-memory to create a "detour" redirecting execution to your injected function.
Create a trampoline (optional). Frequently when doing this sort of injection you'll want to call the original function whose invocation you are intercepting. The way to allow this with a function detour is to create a small code "trampoline" which includes the overwritten instructions of the original function then a jump to the remainder of the original. This can be complex, because any IP-relative instructions in the copied set need to be modified to account for their new addresses.
Automate it all. These steps can be tedious, even if doing some of the simpler solutions posted in other answers. The best way to ensure that the steps are done correctly every time with variable parameters (injecting different functions, etc) is to automate their execution. Starting with the 7.0 series, gdb has included the ability to write new commands in Python. This support can be used to implement a turn-key solution for injecting and detouring code in/to the inferior process.
Here's an example. I have the same a and b executables as before and an inject2.so created from the following code:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int (*rand__)(void) = NULL;
int
rand(void)
{
int result = rand__();
printf("rand invoked! result = %d\n", result);
return result % 47;
}
I can then place my Python detour command in detour.py and have the following gdb session:
(gdb) source detour.py
(gdb) exec-file a
(gdb) set follow-fork-mode child
(gdb) catch exec
Catchpoint 1 (exec)
(gdb) run
Starting program: /home/llasram/ws/detour/a
a: 1933263113
a: 831502921
[New process 8500]
b: 918844931
process 8500 is executing new program: /home/llasram/ws/detour/b
[Switching to process 8500]
Catchpoint 1 (exec'd /home/llasram/ws/detour/b), 0x00007ffff7ddfaf0 in _start ()
from /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
(gdb) break main
Breakpoint 2 at 0x4005d0: file b.c, line 7.
(gdb) cont
Continuing.
Breakpoint 2, main (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffdd68) at b.c:7
7 {
(gdb) detour libc.so.6:rand inject2.so:rand inject2.so:rand__
(gdb) cont
Continuing.
rand invoked! result = 392103444
b: 22
Program exited normally.
In the child process, I create a detour from the rand() function in libc.so.6 to the rand() function in inject2.so and store a pointer to a trampoline for the original rand() in the rand__ variable of inject2.so. And as expected, the injected code calls the original, displays the full result, and returns that result modulo 47.
Due to length, I'm just linking to a pastie containing the code for my detour command. This is a fairly superficial implementation (especially in terms of the trampoline generation), but it should work well in a large percentage of cases. I've tested it with gdb 7.2 (most recently released version) on Linux with both 32-bit and 64-bit executables. I haven't tested it on OS X, but any differences should be relatively minor.
For executables you can easily find the address where the function pointer is stored by using objdump. For example:
objdump -R /bin/bash | grep write
00000000006db558 R_X86_64_JUMP_SLOT fwrite
00000000006db5a0 R_X86_64_JUMP_SLOT write
Therefore, 0x6db5a0 is the adress of the pointer for write. If you change it, calls to write will be redirected to your chosen function. Loading new libraries in gdb and getting function pointers has been covered in earlier posts. The executable and every library have their own pointers. Replacing affects only the module whose pointer was changed.
For libraries, you need to find the base address of the library and add it to the address given by objdump. In Linux, /proc/<pid>/maps gives it out. I don't know whether position-independent executables with address randomization would work. maps-information might be unavailable in such cases.
As long as the function you want to replace is in a shared library, you can redirect calls to that function at runtime (during debugging) by poking at the PLT. Here is an article that might be helpful:
Shared library call redirection using ELF PLT infection
It's written from the standpoint of malware modifying a program, but a much easier procedure is adaptable to live use in the debugger. Basically you just need to find the function's entry in the PLT and overwrite the address with the address of the function you want to replace it with.
Googling for "PLT" along with terms like "ELF", "shared library", "dynamic linking", "PIC", etc. might find you more details on the subject.
You can still us LD_PRELOAD if you make the preloaded function understand the situations it's getting used in. Here is an example that will use the rand() as normal, except inside a forked process when it will always return 42. I use the dl routines to load the standard library's rand() function into a function pointer for use by the hijacked rand().
// -*- compile-command: "gcc -Wall -fPIC -shared my_rand.c -o my_rand.so -ldl"; -*-
//my_rand.c
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
int pid = 0;
int (*real_rand)(void) = NULL;
void f(void) __attribute__ ((constructor));
void f(void) {
pid = getpid();
void* dl = dlopen("libc.so.6", RTLD_LAZY);
if(dl) {
real_rand = dlsym(dl, "rand");
}
}
int rand(void)
{
if(pid == getpid() && real_rand)
return real_rand();
else
return 42;
}
//test.c
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
printf("Super random number: %d\n", rand());
if(fork()) {
printf("original process rand: %d\n", rand());
} else {
printf("forked process rand: %d\n", rand());
}
return 0;
}
jdizzle#pudding:~$ ./test
Super random number: 1804289383
original process rand: 846930886
forked process rand: 846930886
jdizzle#pudding:~$ LD_PRELOAD="/lib/ld-linux.so.2 ./my_rand.so" ./test
Super random number: 1804289383
original process rand: 846930886
forked process rand: 42
I found this tutorial incredibly useful, and so far its the only way I managed to achieve what I was looking with GDB: Code Injection into Running Linux Application: http://www.codeproject.com/KB/DLL/code_injection.aspx
There is also a good Q&A on code injection for Mac here: http://www.mikeash.com/pyblog/friday-qa-2009-01-30-code-injection.html
I frequently use code injection as a method of mocking for automated testing of C code. If that's the sort of situation you're in -- if your use of GDB is simply because you're not interested in the parent processes, and not because you want to interactively select the processes which are of interest -- then you can still use LD_PRELOAD to achieve your solution. Your injected code just needs to determine whether it is in the parent or child processes. There are several ways you could do this, but on Linux, since your child processes exec(), the simplest is probably to look at the active executable image.
I produced two executables, one named a and the other b. Executable a prints the result of calling rand() twice, then fork()s and exec()s b twice. Executable b print the result of calling rand() once. I use LD_PRELOAD to inject the result of compiling the following code into the executables:
// -*- compile-command: "gcc -D_GNU_SOURCE=1 -Wall -std=gnu99 -O2 -pipe -fPIC -shared -o inject.so inject.c"; -*-
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
#define constructor __attribute__((__constructor__))
typedef int (*rand_t)(void);
typedef enum {
UNKNOWN,
PARENT,
CHILD
} state_t;
state_t state = UNKNOWN;
rand_t rand__ = NULL;
state_t
determine_state(void)
{
pid_t pid = getpid();
char linkpath[PATH_MAX] = { 0, };
char exepath[PATH_MAX] = { 0, };
ssize_t exesz = 0;
snprintf(linkpath, PATH_MAX, "/proc/%d/exe", pid);
exesz = readlink(linkpath, exepath, PATH_MAX);
if (exesz < 0)
return UNKNOWN;
switch (exepath[exesz - 1]) {
case 'a':
return PARENT;
case 'b':
return CHILD;
}
return UNKNOWN;
}
int
rand(void)
{
if (state == CHILD)
return 47;
return rand__();
}
constructor static void
inject_init(void)
{
rand__ = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "rand");
state = determine_state();
}
The result of running a with and without injection:
$ ./a
a: 644034683
a: 2011954203
b: 375870504
b: 1222326746
$ LD_PRELOAD=$PWD/inject.so ./a
a: 1023059566
a: 986551064
b: 47
b: 47
I'll post a gdb-oriented solution later.