I am on Mac OSX. I have written two programs to transfer a "Unix Executable file" from one place to another(server program to client program). Here is the code:
Server Side code:
fileDescriptor = open(reqMsg.filename, O_RDONLY);
if (fileDescriptor > 0)
while ((msgLength = read(fileDescriptor, content, MESSAGESIZE)) > 0)
send(data.remoteSocketDes, content, msgLength, 0);
Client Side code:
fileDescriptor = open(data.filename, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY);
if (fileDescriptor > 0)
while ((msgLength = recv(localSocketDes, content, MESSAGESIZE, 0)) > 0)
write(fileDescriptor, content, msgLength);
The size and content of the file is exactly same but the type of file is changed from "Unix Executable file" to "Document". Eventually I am not able to execute it from the place where it has been copied.
Note: the code working properly fine for ".txt" files.
The "executable" property of a file is a function of its permissions, not its content. Simply copying its contents into another file will not preserve this property.
If you want to preserve this, you will need to serialize the permissions of the original file (which you can obtain using stat() on the file), send them to the client, and apply them to the new file (using chmod(), or by passing the permissions to open()).
If preserving file metadata such as this is important, you may also want to consider preserving the creation and modification times and extended attributes of the file as well.
Under Unix (and variants like OS X), the determining factor whether you can execute a command from the shell prompt is whether the file you are trying to execute has the execute bit set (and you have permissions to execute it).
To handle this from the command prompt, you would just use chmod +x {file}, but if you know the incoming file is an executable (possibly by testing in sender first and sending that information through the socket in a preamble), you could code your receiving program to set the execute bit if appropriate by using chmod():
chmod( data.filename, permission)
Where you calculate permission by or'ing the execute bits with the default umask, like so:
mode_t mask = umask (0);
umask (mask);
mode_t permission = mask | S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH;
Note that this will set the permissions to world, group, and owner writable, which might not be desirable. Also note that you MUST call umask the second time, since the first call is destructive.
Related
I'm trying to implement append command in my own shell.
I succeeded to append to existing file but whenever I'm trying to append to file doesn't exist it makes a file without any permission (not read and not write)
if (append) {
fd = open(outfile,'a');
lseek(fd,0,SEEK_END);
close (STDOUT_FILENO) ;
dup(fd);
close(fd);
/* stdout is now appended */
}
What should I do to make a file with permissions
?
The open() system call doesn't use a character constant to indicate 'append'. Read the POSIX specification for open() — and look at O_APPEND etc. You need more flags than just O_APPEND, and you need three arguments to open() if you want to create the file if it doesn't exist (O_CREAT), etc.
if (append)
{
fd = open(outfile, O_CREAT|O_APPEND|O_WRONLY, 0644);
if (fd < 0)
…deal with error…
}
You can write 0644 as S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IROTH but the octal is shorter and (after 30+ years practice) a lot easier to read. You can add write permissions for group (S_IWGRP) and others (S_IWOTH) if you like (0666 in octal), but unless you know you want group members and others to modify the files, it is safer to omit those — for all it goes against historical precedent. Users can and should set the shell umask value to 022 to prevent group and others from being able to write to files by default, but there's no harm (IMO) in being secure without that.
I'm new to Linux, still struggling to understand how permisson control work in Linux. The open function prototype is sth like :
int open(char *filename, int flags, mode_t mode);
Let's I have the following code:
fd = open("foo.txt", O_CREAT|O_RDWR, S_IRUSR)
and let's say the file "foo.txt" didn't exist before, so the above statment will create a file called "foo.txt", and current process who executes this open statment can read and write this file. But after this process terminates, If another process starts and tries to open this file. Below is my question:
Q1-Since the file was created with S_IRUSR(owner can read this file) in the first open call, does it mean that even I as owner of the file, if I start a new process to open this file again, I can only read this file and I cannot write this file, is my understanding correct?
If my understanding is correct, is it sensible/practicable that owners create sth that they cannot have full access to it later?
Q2-If my above understanding is correct, then in the second call to open by a new process. I can only call like:
fd = open("foo.txt", O_RDONLY) // uses flags like O_WRONLY or O_RDWR will throw an error?
since the first open specified the mode as S_IRUSR, which maps to O_RDONLY in the subsequent calls, is my understanding correct?
Correct, if you create the file with permissions S_IRUSR (often written in octal as 0400), then you will not be able to open the file for writing. Attempting to do so will fail and set errno to EACCES.
This is quite practical as it gives you a way to protect files you do not want to accidentally overwrite, as long as the permissions stay as they are. However, as the owner, you have the power to change the permissions later, using the chmod() system call. So it's not as though you have permanently lost the ability to write that file; you can give yourself back that ability whenever you want.
If you look at this code block below by taking into consideration the last parameter "0", Does write line work properly ?
filename = argv[1];
string = "Example string";
if (stat(argv[1], &buf) != 0)
{
fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0);
if (fd < 0)
{
perror(filename);
exit(1);
}
write(fd, string, strlen(string));
close(fd);
}
else
{
print("%s file exists\n", filename);
}
From the manpage:
mode specifies the permissions to use in case a new file is created. This argument must be supplied when O_CREAT is specified in flags; if O_CREAT is not specified, then mode is ignored. The effective permissions are modified by the process's umask in the usual way: The permissions of the created file are (mode & ~umask). Note that this mode applies only to future accesses of the newly created file; the open() call that creates a read-only file may well return a read/write file descriptor.
The following symbolic constants are provided for mode:
S_IRWXU 00700 user (file owner) has read, write and execute permission
S_IRUSR 00400 user has read permission
S_IWUSR 00200 user has write permission
S_IXUSR 00100 user has execute permission
S_IRWXG 00070 group has read, write and execute permission
S_IRGRP 00040 group has read permission
S_IWGRP 00020 group has write permission
S_IXGRP 00010 group has execute permission
S_IRWXO 00007 others have read, write and execute permission
S_IROTH 00004 others have read permission
S_IWOTH 00002 others have write permission
S_IXOTH 00001 others have execute permission
So, specifying a mode of zero, you will create a file with the permissions of 0 & ~umask, i.e. a file without any permissions.
What exactly the filesystem makes of this is not in the domain of the open() or write() functions.
It is valid,
This is from open(2) Linux manual pages
The mode argument specifies the file mode bits be applied when a new file is created. This argument must be supplied when O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE is specified in flags; if neither O_CREAT nor O_TMPFILE is specified, then mode is ignored. The effective mode is modified by the process's umask in the usual way: in the absence of a default ACL, the mode of the created file is (mode & ~umask). Note that this mode applies only to future accesses of the newly created file; the open() call that creates a read-only file may well return a read/write file descriptor.
In theory then, your access to the file will be valid until you call close() as I understand the part I highlighted in the above excerpt.
Interesting question. POSIX says:
The argument following the oflag argument does not affect whether the file is open for reading, writing, or for both.
Which means that since you're handling the error return from open, if you reach the write line the behavior is well defined.
To expand a bit why this works. On most filesystems on unix-like systems, the meta-data related to a file should not affect already open file descriptors. You can for example remove a file that you have opened. This is in fact done quite commonly with temporary files, so that you don't need to remember to delete them on exit. The same applies to permissions or even ownership of the file. In fact, you can chroot while holding a file open and you can still write to it without actually being able to see it. You can even use file descriptor passing to give an open file descriptor to another process that wouldn't be allowed to open that file. This is quite commonly used for privilege separation. The permissions you had when creating a file descriptor are valid regardless of the changes to permissions later. So your question is a very interesting edge case because it asks if the filesystem permissions of the file are set before or after we create a file descriptor for it and POSIX seems to be clear on that.
I can only think of two exceptions to that right now. First is when someone forcibly remounts a filesystem to read-only in that case the kernel will go through horrifying gymnastics to invalidate your file descriptor which will make all its operations fail. Second one is AFS where your permissions are actually checked when you close the file (or, when the last user of the file on your local system closes it which sends it to the server), which leads to hilarious problems where your time-limited access tokens were valid when you opened a file but aren't valid any longer when you close it. This is also why close returns errors (but that's another rant).
This is why I mentioned error handling above. Even though POSIX says that it should not have an effect, I could see AFS or certain other file systems refusing to open such a file.
I call the following code in C:
fileCreatefd = mkstemp(fileName);
I see that the file is created with permissions 600 (-rw-------). I want to create this temp file as -rw-rw-rw-
I tried playing around with umask but that only applies a mask over the file permissions -- at least thats my understanding. So how can i create a file with permissions 666?
Thanks
You cannot create it 0666 with mkstemp. You can change the permissions afterwards, if that is sufficient for your application, with fchmod.
fileCreatefd = mkstemp(fileName);
fchmod(fileCreatefd, 0666)
The mkstemp() function generates a unique temporary filename from template, creates and opens the file, and returns an open file descriptor for the file.
The last six characters of template must be "XXXXXX" and these are replaced with a string that makes the filename unique. Since it will be modified, template must not be a string constant, but should be declared as a character array.
The file is created with permissions 0600, that is, read plus write for owner only. (In glibc versions 2.06 and earlier, the file is created with permissions 0666, that is, read and writefor all users.) The returned file descriptor provides both read and write access to the file. The file is opened with the open(2) O_EXCL flag, guaranteeing that the caller is the process that creates the file.
More generally, the POSIX specification of mkstemp() does not say anything about file modes, so the application should make sure its file mode creation mask (umask(2)) is set appropriately before calling mkstemp() (and mkostemp()).
So after creating the File Use fchmod to change the file permission.
I am writing a program to mimic the cp utility. However, I cannot get the file permissions to work correctly. I know that they are stored in the structure stat and stored in the st_mode field with stat.
My issue is that I do not get the write permission for the group or other categories, i.e. I get -rwxr-xr-x as the permissions for the file even though the source file is -rwxrwxrwx. The statement where I set the permissions is below.
if ( (dest_fd = open(dest_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, (stats.st_mode & S_IRUSR)|(stats.st_mode & S_IWUSR)|(stats.st_mode & S_IXUSR)|(stats.st_mode & S_IRGRP)|(stats.st_mode & S_IWGRP)|(stats.st_mode & S_IXGRP)|(stats.st_mode & S_IROTH)|(stats.st_mode & S_IWOTH)| (stats.st_mode & S_IXOTH))) < 0)
{
printf("There was a problem opening the destination file.");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}//ends the if statement opening the destination file.
The answers so far are right that the problem is umask, but rather than clearing the umask (this is dangerous if your program is multi-threaded or if you might be calling any library functions that create files) I would treat the umask as a user configuration variable you are not allowed to modify, and instead call fchmod on the files after creating them to give them the final permissions you want. This may be necessary anyway to give certain permissions like suid/sgid, which some kernels remove whenever the file is modified. I would also initially create the file with mode 0600, so that there's no race condition between opening it and changing permissions during which another user could get an open handle on the file.
The cause of the problem is
The permissions of the created file are (mode & ~umask)
Typically, umask is 022, so that prohibits creating world-writable files.
*nix masks out mode bits in files you create, but you can change the mask using the umask() function. man umask (perhaps man 2 umask) for details.
You can use the chmod(2) syscall to change the permissions of an existing file or directory or fchmod(2) to set the permissions given an open file descriptor.
To be more secure and to prevent exploitation of possible race conditions, you can use a very restrictive set of permissions while creating the file and then use chmod(2) to restore the original permissions. This is what cp -a does (except that it creates the file with the default permissions):
$ strace cp -a file file1
...
open("file1", O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC) = 4
...
fchmod(4, 0100640) = 0
...
chmod(2) and fchmod(2) are not affected by the value of the umask.