How to properly encrypt information using Core Data - database

I'm developing an app that manages sensitive information. For this reason I would like to give the user the option of creating a password to encrypt the data. This information is only to be saved in the device; the idea is not to encrypt and send the data through a network, but to prevent other people with total access to the device to have access to it.
Now, what I don't know is if I should encrypt the whole data base or encrypt only each entry before saving it. What is the recommended approach to encrypt data bases?

Diego,
Encrypting data is a subtle problem.
First, do the easy stuff. Turn on Apple's file security. That will probably give you more security for less effort than anything you can write. It probably provides all of the security you really need on the device. If it doesn't, you should know exactly what it doesn't provide. That would be the main cause for writing special purpose code. Apple recently posted an excellent white paper on iOS security. We all should read it.
Second, security is broken in subtle and non-obvious ways. It just isn't a matter of firing up the encryption and then hoping for the best. How are you going to handle key distribution to other devices? How are you going to handle lost keys? Do you trust Apple's keychain? (Have they fixed their process in the wake of "goto fail;"?)
The way most security folks I know handle these issues is by building detailed scenarios of use. And then implementing code to see if the design is any good. Then asking their friends and consultants to poke holes in the design; fix the holes until you have "confidence" in your design. If you are new to security, and by the nature of your question I assume you are relatively new to the field, then you should NOT have confidence in your design. You now need to reimplement your design with simpler code and simpler processes. Then put it in front of real users. They will show you how your security process fails in real hands. Bad security design has killed many products and it can kill yours.
I would be very careful. Use what Apple has already carefully engineered. Seriously ask yourself if you need more than that. Ask your management how much they want to spend on security? Ask your users how important the bother of security is for them? I suspect the answer to both questions is: no, they do not want to pay for or bother with security.
As a result, do the simple stuff: use Apple's iOS security.
Anon,
Andrew

Related

Middleware: Using C as the engine, Lua for Adapters...is this bad practice (Security risk)?

I am an integration consultant and tend to use C and Lua in my spare time, unfortunately it is not my day job ;-(
Anyway, I tend to believe that a mixture of C and Lua is perfect for many "product" developments. I currently have an "adapter engine" built in pure C, but would like to actually move the adapter code to Lua....
For example, coding an EMAIL adapter in Lua is far easier than in C...yet I like the "engine speed of C"....
But now there is the big question of security risk in that the user can potentially add whatever he or she wants to the LUa scripts in production.....obviously there we could CHMOD the files...but is that really secure?
Ideally I want the C / Lua combination here....but now do I literally imbed the Lua code in the C application with a CHAR*....or do I issue a lua_dofile??
Thanks for the help
Lynton
First, one of the drawbacks to using C/Lua in production is it tends to be harder to find resources who can develop for these languages. C++ and JavaScript programmers are typically easier to find.
In terms of security, the key here is to use leading practices. Security is about risk reduction, there is no expectation one can achieve perfect security so you need to mitigate risk.
Here are my suggestions:
As with all middleware you need to use a hardened server. This is the first step, if the server is compromised using any platform you are in trouble. Middleware should NOT be in the DMZ.
You want to store the Lua code external to the compiled code (otherwise you lose the advantage of using Lua.) Make that storage as secure as you can. CHMOD is good, a secure DB server is better. The more secure the script store the more secure the system.
You can encrypt the Lua source - this is a trade off since it makes it a little harder to gain the advantage of easy updates and modification. You will probably need to implement decrypted script caching for performance.
Your security is as strong as your weakest link. If you provide a way to modify the Lua source via external access this will be an attack vector. Avoid this design if you can.
You should consider putting in change management checks. For example a separate place in the system where a checksum for each Lua file is stored. Then if an un-authorized change is made to a script you can abort functioning till the security breach is mitigated.
Other than the drawback I mentioned above, I don't think there is anything fundamentally flawed in your plan. If it can aid in making a good middleware system I would say go for it. Just mitigate the risk of your adapter scripts getting compromised as much as possible.
To expand on Donal's comment - given the popularity of node I would say that JavaScript is the the leading practice in scripted middleware right now. If you can handle learning a new scripting language I would say it would be a good idea given the support, popularity, and tools available.
Your primary requirement in terms of security is to ensure that the server cannot evaluate anything send by clients by any mechanism (not just direct evaluation, but also through supplying filenames). A lesser requirement is that they should also not have any mechanism to produce a message that allows other clients to evaluate unexpected things (i.e., avoid XSS trouble). If you can satisfy these requirements, you've got a safe server and the language(s) that it written in won't matter; using multiple languages is in fact a good idea as it lets you leverage the best of each.
It's also a good idea to use a carefully configured firewall, plenty of privilege restriction, some kind of DMZ proxy system to at least verify basic syntactic legality of messages, etc. These things are all just good practice. (Aim to configure things so the server can only just manage to do the service you want to provide.)
With sending email, there are a few other things to beware of. In particular, you do not want to be a conduit for spam, so you need to take care to ensure that arbitrary email headers cannot be constructed from client input and that the data formats you send out are non-executable (or that the data is constructed in a way that is non-evil). Rate limiting is also a good idea; unless your site is insanely popular, you shouldn't need to send more than a few messages a second across all clients. If you're ever sending only to a small set of addresses (e.g., to a fixed contact address) then you can relax these restrictions a bit (but still be careful of header injection). In all cases, route all email by a specialist email handling server instead of doing routing yourself as this avoids a whole lot of configuration difficulties.

Safe to store unencrypted password into HTML5 client side database?

I am assuming the answer is that storing a password in a WEBSQL database on the client side, unencrypted is not safe, but i thought i would ask anyway, the reason I am asking, is I am trying to add a dropbox uploading tool to a web app, but i need the password in plain text in order to access the user's dropbox account, i surely could come up with some foobar way to hash the passwords client side, and unhash them when needed, but if I will be able to unhash them, anyone will be able to do so as well, does anyone have a work around if this is the case?
There is no such thing as 100% secure or safe. The goal of security is to be safe enough. You determine what is the risk, and what is the level of pain you are willing to go through and find the sweet spot.
If you have to get a plain text back from a cypher you have no choice but to use encryption not hashing. Of course you have to have the key somewhere, whether user entered or stored somewhere so the key is vulnerable.
Since this is on a client computer, it may be vulnerable to phishing attacks, social engineering attacks, trojan/keylogger/virus attacks, physical security risks, etc.
storing clear text is a bad idea, but other than that you have to decide what level of pain the users will suffer through.
PKI tokens are a good option if the cost is worth it. otherwise most languages have many various encryption algorithms that can be used effectively.
No, it's not safe to store plaintext passwords, period.
Assuming your users log into your web app with a password, why not use that password to encrypt their (salted) dropbox password? That's still less than satisfactory from a security standpoint, but it's better than nothing.
Using the words "foobar" and "dropbox" in the same paragraph is a clear signal that you're asking for trouble with a home-grown solution. You're asking your users to trust you with the security of their dropbox data, which means you're accepting an awful lot of liability. You're also asking your users to violate one of the fundamental laws of security: Never trust your security to a third party.
The best advice I can offer is to delegate all security-related tasks to an expert, and have that code audited by another expert.

Translucent Databases

I am building an application with health information inside. This application will be consumer-facing with is new for me. I would like a method to put privacy concerns completely at ease. As I review methods for securing sensitive data in publicly accessible databases I have frequently come across the notion of database translucency. There is the original book on the subject and an excellent tutorial on the subject from Oriellynet.
My concern is that I have seen very little information regarding this idea on what I would consider very-modern programming sites (like this one). There does not seem to be an article about the idea on wikipedia. No questions on the subject here, and no very recent tutorials or articles on the subject. To be uber-brief, the idea is that certain data is clear to some users of the system, while other users a cryptographically prevented from accessing that data, even if they have administrator access.
I have done substantial work on a prototype database that provides translucent data access. I have run across a considerable problem: To be truly translucent, there can be no mechanism for password recovery. If an administrator can reset a users password, then they can briefly gain access to a users data. To be truly translucent, the user must never loose the password.
Those of us who use strong encryption to protect private data in our daily lives (technorati to be sure) are used to this problem when using these kinds of strong encryption systems. If the word "blowfish" is part of your daily lexicon that is one thing, but a website that is consumer focused? I am concerned that users will not be willing to wrap their mind around the "truly encrypted just for you" notion implicit with true database translucency. I am afraid of the support call that begins with "I lost my password" and ends with me saying "There is nothing that I can do for you".
My question: Should I implement this method in my application? Are there other open source applications that have gone down this route that I can compare database designs with (esp using php/MySQL)? I anyone else pursuing these kind of truly secure, but really inconvenient feature sets? Is there another database security model that is more popular and modern that I have missed? Was database translucency a fad or a legitimate database design method that I should embrace? While I always appreciate discussion I would prefer objective answers that I can leverage in my design.
So, I've been looking at something similar to this recently, and hit upon the same issue. The solution I'm considering implementing is as follows:
Upon registration, create a unique, secure (long) key for the user and use this to encrypt their data.
Encrypt this key with the user's password using e.g. AES and store it in the database.
At this point, you're still in the situation where if the user forgets their password, they've had it.
Create a public/private key pair representing your organisation, and store the public key on the server.
Split the private portion of the key into several components and give each to people (e.g. directors of your company) who have a significant stake (preferably financial) in the continued success of your company. Do this such that any two, or any three people can get together and restore the full private key when required. Encrypt each person's key with their own password.
When a user registers, as well as encrypting their key with their password, encrypt it with the organisational public key and store it somewhere.
Create a password reset form which records a request to reset the password of a user, along with some proof that the user is who they say they are (e.g. challenge/response).
Record these reset requests (optionally encrypted using the public key again) in the database.
Once per hour/day/week/month, get the requisite key-holders together, and use their combined keys to process the accrued reset requests, decrypting the keys of users who successfully proved they are who they say they are.
There are lots of challenges and considerations in this. I've got a few thoughts on most of these, but would be interested in others opinions too:
How to split the key safely between multiple people so that no one person can decrypt the stored keys.
How to minimise the number of keys that would be exposed if the 'master keys' genuinely fell into the wrong hands.
How to make sure that if (heaven forbid) your key-holders lost their keys, then (a) there's no risk of exposure of the data, and (b) there's no risk that suddenly the ability to reset passwords is lost forever.
How to successfully validate that someone really is who they say they are without making this a glaring hole in your whole security approach.
Anything you implement in this area WILL reduce the security of the translucent database approach, without a doubt, but this may be a worthwhile compromise depending on the nature of your data.
Should I implement this method in my application?
Well like other things in life, there is a trade off :) It's probably more secure but harder to built.
Are there other open source applications that have gone down this route that I can compare database designs with (esp using php/MySQL)?
Don't know, I guess the tools are there to do it yourself :)
Is anyone else pursuing these kind of truly secure, but really inconvenient feature sets?
Yes, but it seems like it's still in an immature state, like your problem you describe concerning lost passwords.
Is there another database security model that is more popular and modern that I have missed?
Basically there are two kinds of database connections. One option gives users a real database account, the other is to use single sign-on to the database. Prior to the web coming along, there were proponents of both models in the client/server world, but amongst web developers the single sign-on method is leading.
Was database translucency a fad or a legitimate database design method that I should embrace?
Don't think so, the UNIX password database, for instance, is a great example of a basic translucent database ;)
here something to read link text
Re: translucent databases. You could, I suppose, use fingerprints. What about burn victims, or people who end up losing their fingerprints? Oops. Is it worth that small percentage of users?
Familiarize yourself with HIPAA, especially when it comes to technology.
Remember that no system is truly secure, except Skynet*, and look what happened with that! Humans are in charge. When you work in a medical company, you sign an NDA indicating that you won't release any of the information you learn as part of your duties because it is confidential.
There will be someone to reset people's passwords. That's the way it is, because not everyone is technologically competent, and that's the way it stays for now.
You only have to implement security as well as HIPAA says.
in truth, there is another truly secure system: it is unplugged from both the network and the electricity, and it is turned off.
Slightly different solution, you might want to check out cryptdb:
http://css.csail.mit.edu/cryptdb/

Steps to publish Software to be purchased via Registration

I'm about to get finished developing a windows application which I want to release as shareware. It was developed in C# and will be running on .Net 3.5+ machines.
To use it the user will have to be online.
My intent is to let the user try it for 30 days and then limit its functionality until a registration is purchased.
The installer will be made available via an msi file.
Could anyone give the general steps on how to implement this?
Here are some more specific questions:
Since I am trying to avoid having to invest a lot upfront in order to establish an e-commerce site, I was thinking of a way to just let the user pay somehow, while supplying his email in which he then receives the unlock key.
I found some solutions out there like listed here:
Registration services
I am still not sure, if they are the way to go.
One of my main concerns is to prevent the reuse if a given serial, e.g. if two users run the program with the same serial at the same time, this serial should disabled or some other measure be taken.
Another point is, that my software could potentially be just copied from one computer to the other without using an installer, so to just protect the installer itself will not be sufficient.
Maybe someone who already went though this process can give me some pointers, like the general steps involved (like 1. Get domain, 2. Get certain kind of webhost ....) and address some of the issues I mentioned above.
I'm thankful for any help people can give me.
I don't have a useful answer for you, but I did have a couple observations I wanted to share that were too large to fit in a comment. Hopefully someone else with more technical expertise can fill in the details.
One of my main concerns is to prevent the reuse if a given serial, e.g. if two users run the program with the same serial at the same time, this serial should disabled or some other measure be taken.
To ensure that two people aren't using the same serial number, your program will have to "phone home." A lot of software does this at installation time, by transmitting the serial number back to you during the installation process. If you want to do it in real time, your application will have to periodically connect to your server and say "this serial number is in use."
This is not terribly user friendly. Any time that the serial number check is performed, the user must be connected to the Internet, and must have their firewall configured to allow it. It also means that you must commit to maintaining the server side of things (domain name, server architecture) unchanged forever. If your server goes down, or you lose the domain, your software will become inoperative.
Of course, if a connection to your service specifically (rather than the Internet in general) is essential to the product's operation, then it becomes a lot easier and more user friendly.
Another point is, that my software could potentially be just copied from one computer to the other without using an installer, so to just protect the installer itself will not be sufficient.
There are two vectors of attack here. One is hiding a piece of information somewhere on the user's system. This is not terribly robust. The other is to check and encode the user's hardware configuration and encode that data somewhere. If the user changes their hardware, force the product to reactivate itself (this is what Windows and SecuROM do).
As you implement this, please remember that it is literally impossible to prevent illegal copying of software. As a (presumably) small software developer, you need to balance the difficulty to crack your software against the negative effects your DRM imposes on your users. I personally would be extremely hesitant to use software with the checks that you've described in place. Some people are more forgiving than I am. Some people are less so.
The energy and effort to prevent hacks from breaking your code is very time consuming. You'd be better served by focusing on distribution and sales.
My first entry into shareware was 1990. Back then the phrase was S=R which stood for Shareware equals Registered. A lot has changed since then. The web is full of static and you have to figure out how to get heard above the static.
Here's somethings I've learned
Don't fall in love with your software. Someone will always think it should work differently. Don't try and convert them to your way of thinking instead listen and build a list of enhancements for the next release.
Learn how to sell or pay someone to help you sell your stuff
Digital River owns most of the registration companies out there
Create free loss leaders that direct traffic back to you
Find a niche that is has gone unmet and fill it
Prevent copying: base the key on the customer's NIC MAC. Most users will not go to the trouble of modifying their NIC MAC. Your app will have a dialog to create and send the key request, including their MAC.
The open issue is that many apps get cracked and posted to warez sites. Make this less likely by hiding the key validation code in multiple places in your app. Take care to treat honest users with respect, and be sure your key validation does not annoy them in any way.
Make it clear that the key they are buying is node locked.
And worry about market penetration. Get a larger installed base by providing a base product that has no strings attached.
cheers -- Rick

Software protection for small vendors

This is a problem we all have to consider at some point.
After many years and many approaches I tend to agree in general with the staterment:
"For any protected software used by more than a few hundred people, you can find a cracked version. So far, every protection scheme can be tampered with."
Does your employer enforce the use of anti-piracy software?
Further, every time I post about this subject, some one will remind me;
"First of all, no matter what kind of protection you'll employ,a truly dedicated cracker will, eventually, get through all of the protective barriers."
What's the best value for money c# code protection for a single developer
So not withstanding these two broadly true disclaimers, lets talk about "protection"!
I still feel that for smaller apps that are unlikely to warrent the time and attention of a skilled cracker, protection IS a worthwhile exercise.
It seems obvious that no matter what you do, if the cracker can switch the outcome of an IF statement (jmp) by patching the application, then all the passwords and dongles in the world anre not going to help.
So My approach has been to obfuscate the code with virtualization using products like:
http://www.oreans.com/codevirtualizer.php
I have been very happy with this product. To my knowledge it has neve been defeated.
I can even compress the executable with PEcompact
Does anyone else have experience with it?
Had nothing but problems with EXEcryptor
http://www.strongbit.com/news.asp
Even the site is a headache to use.
The compiled apps would crash when doing any WMI calls.
This approach allows you to surround smaller sections of code with the obfuscation and thus protect the security checking etc.
I Use the online authorization approach, as the application needs data from the server regularly so it makes no sense for the user to use it off line for extended periods. By definition, the app is worthless at that point, even if it is cracked.
So a simple encrypted handshake is plenty good. I just check it occasionally within the obfuscation protection. If the user installs the app on a different machine, a New ID is uploaded upon launch and the server disables the old ID and returns a new authorization.
I also use a hash of the compiled app and check it at launch to see if a single bit has changed, then open the app as a file (with a read LOCK) from within the app to prevent anyone changing it once launched.
Since all static strings are clearly visible in the .exe file, I try to be generic with error messages and so forth. You will not find the string "Authorization failed" anywhere.
To protect against memory dumps, I use a simple text obfuscation technique (like XOR every character) This makes plain text data in memory harder to distinguish from variables and so forth.
Then of course there is AES for any data that is really sensitive. I like counter mode for text as this results in no repeating sequences revealing underlying data like a sequence of white spaces.
But with all these techniques, if the Key or Initialization vector can be dumped from memory, or the IF statement bypassed, everything is wasted.
I tend to use a switch statement rather than a conditional statement. Then I create a second function that is basically a dead end instead of the function that actually performs the desired task.
Another idea is to code pointers with a variable added. The variable is the result of the authorization (usually zero). This will inevitable lead to a GPF at some point.
I only use this as a last resort after a few lower level authorizations have failed otherwise real users may encounter it. Then the reputation of your software is lowered.
What techniques do you use?
(this is NOT a thread debating the merits of implementing something. It is designed for those that have decided to do SOMETHING)
I disagree xsl.
We protect our code, not because we want to protect our revenue - we accept that those who would use if without a license probably would never pay for it anyway.
Instead, we do it to protect the investment our customers have made in our software. We believe that the use of our software makes them more competative in their market place and that if other companies have access to it without paying they have an unfair advantage - ie, they become as competative without having the overhead of the licensing cost.
We are very careful to ensure that the protection - which is home grown - is as unobtrusive as possible to the valid users, and to this end we would never consider 'buying in' an off the shelf solution that may impact this.
You don't need a few hundred users to get your software cracked. I got annoyed at having my shareware cracked so many times, so as an experiment I created a program called Magic Textbox (which was just a form with a textbox on it) and released it to shareware sites (it had its own PAD file and everything). A day later a cracked version of Magic Textbox was available.
This experience made me pretty much give up trying to protect my software with anything more than rudimentary copy protection.
I personally use the code techniques discussed here. These tricks have the benefit of inconveniencing pirates without making life more difficult for your legitimate end-users
But the more interesting question isn't "what", but "why". Before a software vendor embarks on this type of exercise, it's really important to build a threat model. For example, the threats for a low-priced B2C game are entirely different to those for a high-value B2B app.
Patrick Mackenzie has a good essay where he discusses some of the threats, including an analysis of 4 types of potential customer. I recommend doing this threat analysis for your own app before making choices about protecting your business model.
I've implemented hardware keying (dongles) before myself, so I'm not totally unfamiliar with the issues. In fact, I've given it a great deal of thought. I don't agree with anyone violating copyright law, as your crackers are doing. Anyone who doesn't want to legally aquire a copy of your software should do without. I don't ever violate software copyright myself. That being said...
I really, really dislike the word "protect" used here. The only thing you are trying to protect is your control. You are not protecting the software. The software is just fine either way, as are your users.
The reason that keeping people from copying and sharing your software is such an unholy PITA is that preventing such activites is unnatural. The whole concept of a computer revolves around copying data, and it is simple human nature to want to share useful things. You can fight these facts if you really insist, but it will be a lifelong fight. God isn't making humans any differently, and I'm not buying a computer that can't copy things. Perhaps it would be better to find some way to work with computers and people, rather than fighting against them all the time?
I, along with the majority of professional software developers, am employed full time by a company that needs software developed so that it can do its business, not so it can have a "software product" with artificial scarcity to "sell" to users. If I write something generally useful (that isn't considered a "competive advantage" here), we can release it as Free Software. No "protection" is needed.
From some of the links:
The concept I tried to explain is what I call the “crack spread”. It doesn’t matter that a crack (or keygen, or pirated serial, or whatever) exists for your application. What matters is how many people have access to the crack.
Where/when to check the serial number: I check once on startup. A lot of people say “Check in all sorts of places”, to make it harder for someone to crack by stripping out the check. If you want to be particularly nasty to the cracker, check in all sorts of places using inlined code (i.e. DON’T externalize it all into SerialNumberVerifier.class) and if at all possible make it multi-threaded and hard to recognize when it fails, too. But this just makes it harder to make the crack, not impossible, and remember your goal is generally not to defeat the cracker. Defeating the cracker does not make you an appreciable amount of money. You just need to defeat the casual user in most instances, and the casual user does not have access to a debugger nor know how to use one.
If you’re going to phone home, you should be phoning home with their user information and accepting the serial number as the output of your server’s script, not phoning home with the serial number and accepting a boolean, etc, as the output. i.e. you should be doing key injection, not key verification. Key verification has to ultimately happen within the application, which is why public key crypto is the best way to do it. The reason is that the Internet connection is also in the hands of the adversary :) You’re a hosts file change away from a break-once, break-everywhere exploit if your software is just expecting to read a boolean off the Internet.
Do not make an “interesting” or “challenging” protection. Many crackers crack for the intellectual challenge alone. Make your protection hard to crack but as boring as possible.
There are some cracks which search for byte patterns in search for the place to patch. They usually aren’t defeated by a recompile, but if your .EXE is packed (by ASProtect, Armadillo, etc) these kind of cracks must first unpack the .EXE.. and if you use a good packer such as ASProtect, the cracker will be able to unpack the EXE manually using an assembly level debugger such as SoftICE, but won’t be able to create a tool which unpacks the .EXE automatically (to apply the byte patches afterwards).
I have used .NET Reactor in the past with good results - http://www.eziriz.com/
What I liked about this product is that it did not require you to obfuscate the code in order to have pretty good protection.
xsl, that is a very narrow point of view with MANY built in assumtions.
It seems obvious to me that any app that relies on delivering something from a server under your control should be able to do a fairly good job of figuring our who has a valid account!
I am also of the belief that regular updates (meaning a newly compiled app with code in different locations) will make cracked vesrions obsolete quickly. If your app communicates with a server, launching a secondary process to replace the main executable every week is a piece of cake.
So yes, nothing is uncrackable, but with some clever intrinsic design, it becomes a moot point. The only factor that is significant is how much time are the crackers willing to spend on it, and how much effort are your potential customers willing to exert in trying to find the product of their efforts on a weekly or even daily basis!
I suspect that if your app provides a usefull valuable function then they will be willing to pay a fair price for it. If not, Competitive products will enter the market and your problme just solved itself.

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