I just read about Address Space Layout Randomization and I tried a very simple script to try to brute force it. Here is the program I used to test a few things.
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
int main (int argc, char **argv)
{
char buf[8];
printf("&buf = %p\n", buf);
if (argc > 1 && strcpy(buf, argv[1]));
return 0;
}
I compiled it with this command:
gcc -g -fno-stack-protector -o vul vul.c
I made sure ASLR was enabled:
$ sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space
kernel.randomize_va_space = 2
Then, I came up with this simple script:
str=`perl -e 'print "\x40\xfa\xbb\xbf"x10 \
. "\x90"x65536 \
. "\x31\xc0\x40\x89\xc3\xcd\x80"'`
while [ $? -ne 1 ]; do
./vul $str
done
The format is
return address many times | 64KB NOP slide | shellcode that runs exit(1)
After running this script for a few seconds it exits with error code 1 as I wanted it to. I also tried other shellcodes that call execv("/bin/sh", ...) and I was successful as well.
I find it strange that it's possible to create such a long NOP slide even after the return address. I thought ASLR was more effective, did I miss something? Is it because the address space is too small?
EDIT: I did some additional research and here is what I found:
I asked a friend to run this code using -m32 -z execstack on his 64b computer and after changing the return address a bit, he had the same results.
Even though I did not use -z execstack, I managed to execute the shellcode. I made sure of that by using different shellcodes which all did what they were supposed to do (even the well know scenario chown root ./vul, chmod +s ./vul, shellcode that runs setreuid(0, 0) then execv("/bin/sh", ...) and finally whoami that returns 'root' in the spawned shell).
That is quite strange since execstack -q ./vul tels me the executable stack flag bit is not set. Does anyone have an idea why?
First of all, I'm a bit surprised that you do not need to pass the option -z execstack to the compiler to get the shellcode to execute the exit(1).
Moreover, I guess you are on a 32bits machine as you did not pass the option -m32 to gcc in order to get 32bits code.
Finally, I did run your program without success (I waited way more than a few seconds).
So, I'm a bit doubtful about your conclusion (except if you are running a very peculiar Linux system or may have been lucky).
Anyway, there are two main things that you have not mentionned:
Having a bug that offer an unlimited exploitation windows is quite rare.
Most of the modern systems run on amd64 (64bits) processors, which lower drastically the probability to hit the nop-zone.
You may take a look at the section "ASLR Effectiveness" on the ASLR's Wikipedia page.
Related
what have i done wrong (or didn't do) that gdb is not working properly for me?
root#6be3d60ab7c6:/# cat minimal.c
int main()
{
int i = 1337;
return 0;
}
root#6be3d60ab7c6:/# gcc -g minimal.c -o minimal
root#6be3d60ab7c6:/# gdb minimal
GNU gdb (Ubuntu 7.7.1-0ubuntu5~14.04.2) 7.7.1
.
.
.
Reading symbols from minimal...done.
(gdb) break main
Breakpoint 1 at 0x4004f1: file minimal.c, line 3.
(gdb) run
Starting program: /minimal
warning: Error disabling address space randomization: Operation not permitted
During startup program exited normally.
(gdb)
(gdb) print i
No symbol "i" in current context.
If you're using Docker, you probably need the --security-opt seccomp=unconfined option (as well as enabling ptrace):
docker run --cap-add=SYS_PTRACE --security-opt seccomp=unconfined
For whatever reason, your user account doesn't have permission to disable the kernel's address space layout randomisation for this process. By default, gdb turns this off because it makes some sorts of debugging easier (in particular, it means the address of stack objects will be the same each time you run your program). Read more here.
You can work around this problem by disabling this feature of gdb with set disable-randomization off.
As for getting your user the permission needed to disable ASLR, it probably boils down to having write permission to /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space. Read more here.
Building on wisbucky's answer (thank you!), here are the same settings for Docker compose:
security_opt:
- seccomp:unconfined
cap_add:
- SYS_PTRACE
The security option seccomp:unconfined fixed the address space randomization warnings.
The capability SYS_PTRACE didn't seem to have a noticeable effect even though the Docker documentation states that SYS_PTRACE is a capability that is "not granted by default". Perhaps I don't know what to look for.
I want to build a dedicated Linux system that only ever runs one binary program. This program takes control of the screen via the OpenGL driver and displays patterns. There needs to be keyboard input as well to configure the patterns. Since running this one program will be the sole purpose of the machine, I don't need any GUI, networking, etc. Also, I probably don't need any process scheduling in the kernel since only one process will ever run.
Is it possible to replace /sbin/init with my own binary to achieve this? After the kernel loads, it would then immediately execute my own binary, and that would run the entire time the machine was on. Basically, I want to emulate the way a microcontroller works, but with the benefit of being able to use an x86 CPU with different hardware devices and drivers.
Minimal init hello world program step-by-step
Compile a hello world without any dependencies that ends in an infinite loop. init.S:
.global _start
_start:
mov $1, %rax
mov $1, %rdi
mov $message, %rsi
mov $message_len, %rdx
syscall
jmp .
message: .ascii "FOOBAR FOOBAR FOOBAR FOOBAR FOOBAR FOOBAR FOOBAR\n"
.equ message_len, . - message
We cannot use sys_exit, or else the kernel panics.
Then:
mkdir d
as --64 -o init.o init.S
ld -o init d/init.o
cd d
find . | cpio -o -H newc | gzip > ../rootfs.cpio.gz
ROOTFS_PATH="$(pwd)/../rootfs.cpio.gz"
This creates a filesystem with our hello world at /init, which is the first userland program that the kernel will run. We could also have added more files to d/ and they would be accessible from the /init program when the kernel runs.
Then cd into the Linux kernel tree, build is as usual, and run it in QEMU:
git clone git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
cd linux
git checkout v4.9
make mrproper
make defconfig
make -j"$(nproc)"
qemu-system-x86_64 -kernel arch/x86/boot/bzImage -initrd "$ROOTFS_PATH"
And you should see a line:
FOOBAR FOOBAR FOOBAR FOOBAR FOOBAR FOOBAR FOOBAR
on the emulator screen! Note that it is not the last line, so you have to look a bit further up.
You can also use C programs if you link them statically:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main() {
printf("FOOBAR FOOBAR FOOBAR FOOBAR FOOBAR FOOBAR FOOBAR\n");
sleep(0xFFFFFFFF);
return 0;
}
with:
gcc -static init.c -o init
You can run on real hardware with a USB on /dev/sdX and:
make isoimage FDINITRD="$ROOTFS_PATH"
sudo dd if=arch/x86/boot/image.iso of=/dev/sdX
Great source on this subject: http://landley.net/writing/rootfs-howto.html It also explains how to use gen_initramfs_list.sh, which is a script from the Linux kernel source tree to help automate the process.
Next step: setup BusyBox so you can interact with the system through a shell. Buildroot is a great way to do it.
Tested on Ubuntu 16.10, QEMU 2.6.1.
It might be possible to replace /sbin/init by your program, but you should be aware that process 1 has some specific duties. So I think it is not advisable to replace it.
Remember that a Linux kernel can also start some processes magically, outside of the usual fork from a process inherited by the init process. I'm thinking of things like /sbin/modprobe or /sbin/hotplug etc.
Also, udev (or systemd) have some special roles. On some systems, fan control was related to such things (I really forgot the details). If unlucky, you could burn your hardware if fan is not working well (but AFAIK this is no more true on recent hardware).
By seeking with string the vmlinux in a recent 3.15.3 kernel, I find that it knows about:
/bin/init
/bin/sh
/sbin/request-key
/sbin/tomoyo-init
/sbin/modprobe
/sbin/poweroff
/sbin/hotplug
I would recommend instead keeping some existing init program, and configure it to run only your program.
You can put your program to initrd, and then run it from initrd's init.
Simply use a boot paramter eg) init=/bin/bash
init is the process 1, used by kernel to start user space, which as a few specific duties like reaping children periodical to clean out zombies. Sounds like you don't even need that.
Linux Boot parameters you should know
I am on CentOS 6.4 32 bit and am trying to cause a buffer overflow in a program. Within GDB it works. Here is the output:
[root#localhost bufferoverflow]# gdb stack
GNU gdb (GDB) Red Hat Enterprise Linux (7.2-60.el6_4.1)
Copyright (C) 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Type "show copying"
and "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i686-redhat-linux-gnu".
For bug reporting instructions, please see:
<http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/>...
Reading symbols from /root/bufferoverflow/stack...done.
(gdb) r
Starting program: /root/bufferoverflow/stack
process 6003 is executing new program: /bin/bash
Missing separate debuginfos, use: debuginfo-install glibc-2.12-1.107.el6_4.2.i686
sh-4.1#
However when I run the program stack just on its own it seg faults. Why might this be?
Exploit development can lead to serious headaches if you don't adequately account for factors that introduce non-determinism into the debugging process. In particular, the stack addresses in the debugger may not match the addresses during normal execution. This artifact occurs because the operating system loader places both environment variables and program arguments before the beginning of the stack:
Since your vulnerable program does not take any arguments, the environment variables are likely the culprit. Mare sure they are the same in both invocations, in the shell and in the debugger. To this end, you can wrap your invocation in env:
env - /path/to/stack
And with the debugger:
env - gdb /path/to/stack
($) show env
LINES=24
COLUMNS=80
In the above example, there are two environment variables set by gdb, which you can further disable:
unset env LINES
unset env COLUMNS
Now show env should return an empty list. At this point, you can start the debugging process to find the absolute stack address you envision to jump to (e.g., 0xbffffa8b), and hardcode it into your exploit.
One further subtle but important detail: there's a difference between calling ./stack and /path/to/stack: since argv[0] holds the program exactly how you invoked it, you need to ensure equal invocation strings. That's why I used /path/to/stack in the above examples and not just ./stack and gdb stack.
When learning to exploit with memory safety vulnerabilities, I recommend to use the wrapper program below, which does the heavy lifting and ensures equal stack offsets:
$ invoke stack # just call the executable
$ invoke -d stack # run the executable in GDB
Here is the script:
#!/bin/sh
while getopts "dte:h?" opt ; do
case "$opt" in
h|\?)
printf "usage: %s -e KEY=VALUE prog [args...]\n" $(basename $0)
exit 0
;;
t)
tty=1
gdb=1
;;
d)
gdb=1
;;
e)
env=$OPTARG
;;
esac
done
shift $(expr $OPTIND - 1)
prog=$(readlink -f $1)
shift
if [ -n "$gdb" ] ; then
if [ -n "$tty" ]; then
touch /tmp/gdb-debug-pty
exec env - $env TERM=screen PWD=$PWD gdb -tty /tmp/gdb-debug-pty --args $prog "$#"
else
exec env - $env TERM=screen PWD=$PWD gdb --args $prog "$#"
fi
else
exec env - $env TERM=screen PWD=$PWD $prog "$#"
fi
Here is a straightforward way of running your program with identical stacks in the terminal and in gdb:
First, make sure your program is compiled without stack protection,
gcc -m32 -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -o shelltest shelltest.c -g
and and ASLR is disabled:
echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
NOTE: default value on my machine was 2, note yours before changing this.
Then run your program like so (terminal and gdb respectively):
env -i PWD="/root/Documents/MSec" SHELL="/bin/bash" SHLVL=0 /root/Documents/MSec/shelltest
env -i PWD="/root/Documents/MSec" SHELL="/bin/bash" SHLVL=0 gdb /root/Documents/MSec/shelltest
Within gdb, make sure to unset LINES and COLUMNS.
Note: I got those environment variables by playing around with a test program.
Those two runs will give you identical pointers to the top of the stack, so no need for remote script shenanigans if you're trying to exploit a binary hosted remotely.
The address of stack frame pointer when running the code in gdb is different from running it normally. So you may corrupt the return address right in gdb mode, but it may not right when running in normal mode. The main reason for that is the environment variables differ among the two situation.
As this is just a demo, you can change the victim code, and print the address of the buffer. Then change your return address to offset+address of buffer.
In reality, however,you need to guess the return address add NOP sled before your malicious code. And you may guess multiple times to get a correct address, as your guess may be incorrect.
Hope this can help you.
The reason your buffer overflow works under gdb and segfaults otherwise is that gdb disables address space layout randomization. I believe this was turned on by default in gdb version 7.
You can check this by running this command:
show disable-randomization
And set it with
set disable-randomization on
or
set disable-randomization off
I have tried the solution accepted here and It doesn't work (for me). I knew that gdb added environment variables and for that reason the stack address doesn't match, but even removing that variables I can't work my exploit without gdb (I also tried the script posted in the accepted solution).
But searching in the web I found other script that work for me: https://github.com/hellman/fixenv/blob/master/r.sh
The use is basically the same that script in the accepted solution:
r.sh gdb ./program [args] to run the program in gdb
r.sh ./program [args] to run the program without gdb
And this script works for me.
I am on CentOS 6.4 32 bit and am trying to cause a buffer overflow in a program... However when I run the program stack just on its own it seg faults.
You should also ensure FORTIFY_SOURCE is not affecting your results. The seg fault sounds like FORTIFY_SOURCE could be the issue because FORTIFY_SOURCE will insert "safer" function calls to guard against some types of buffer overflows. If the compiler can deduce destination buffer sizes, then the size is checked and abort() is called on a violation (i.e., your seg fault).
To turn off FORTIFY_SOURCE for testing, you should compile with -U_FORTIFY_SOURCE or -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=0.
One of the main things that gdb does that doesnt happen outside gdb is zero memory. More than likely somewhere in the code you are not initializing your memory and it is getting garbage values. Gdb automatically clears all memory that you allocate hiding those types of errors.
For example: the following should work in gdb, but not outside it:
int main(){
int **temp = (int**)malloc(2*sizeof(int*)); //temp[0] and temp[1] are NULL in gdb, but not outside
if (temp[0] != NULL){
*temp[0] = 1; //segfault outside of gdb
}
return 0;
}
Try running your program under valgrind to see if it can detect this issue.
I think the best way works out for me is to attach the process of the binary with gdb and using setarch -R <binary> to temporarily disable the ASLR protection only for the binary. This way the stack frame should be the same within and without gdb.
When I run programs with segfaults I get an error message Segmentation fault: 11. For some reason, I'm not getting the (core dumped) message. I tried running the shell command ulimit -c unlimited, but I still get the same error and it doesn't say core dumped. I'm new to GDB so I tried it with a simple program:
/* coredump.c */
#include <stdio.h>
int main (void) {
int *point = NULL;
*point = 0;
return 0;
}
But when I compile using:
gcc coredump.c -g -o coredump
And run it, it still says segfault: 11
Is it still creating a core dump somewhere I don't know about? I want to be able to use gdb coredump core.
Look at this link:
How to generate a core dump in Linux when a process gets a segmentation fault?
Options include:
ulimit -c unlimited (default = 0: no core files generated)
the directory for the dump must be writable. By default this is the current directory of the process, but that may be changed by setting /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern.
in some conditions, the kernel value in /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable may prevent the core to be generated.
"man core" for other options
find / -name core -print 2> /dev/null to search your filesystem for core files
I presume you're running Linux, and I presume you're executing the .exe in a directory where you have write permissions.
So my top two guesses would be 1) "ulimit -c unlimited" isn't getting set, or is being overridden, or 2) the core files are being generated, but going "somewhere else".
The above suggestions should help. Please post back what you find!
If you're running the program that crashes from the shell, then you should follow the guidelines in Apple's Tech Note TN2124, which I found out about in in the answer to SO2207233.
There are a few key points:
You need to set ulimit -c unlimited in bash (same effect, different command in tcsh).
You need to set the permissions on the /cores directory so that you can create files in it. The default permissions are 1775; you need 1777. The 1 indicates the sticky bit is set.
The core dumps are then created in /cores suffixed with a PID (/cores/core.5312, for example).
If you want programs launched graphically to dump core when they crash, then you need to create /etc/launchd.conf if it does not already exist, and add a line limit core unlimited to the file. Again, see the information in the Tech Note for more details.
Watch it; core dumps are huge! Consider this not very complicated or big program:
#include <stdio.h>
int main(void)
{
int *i = 0;
int j = 0;
printf("i = %d, j = %d, i / j = %d\n", *i, j, *i / j);
return 0;
}
The core dump from this is nearly 360 MB.
Using gcc, if you add the flags:
gcc -g -dH
you should be able to generate a core dump
The -g flag produces some debugging information to use with gdb, and the -dH flag produces a core dump when there is an error
Sometimes core files are not store in current directory and may follow a different naming rule
sysctl -a | grep kern.core
may give hints to where your core files are stored
Is it possible that I can view the line number and file name (for my program running with ltrace/strace) along with the library call/system call information.
Eg:
code section :: ptr = malloc(sizeof(int)*5); (file:code.c, line:21)
ltrace or any other tool: malloc(20) :: code.c::21
I have tried all the options of ltrace/strace but cannot figure out a way to get this info.
If not possible through ltrace/strace, do we have any parallel tool option for GNU/Linux?
You may be able to use the -i option (to output the instruction pointer at the time of the call) in strace and ltrace, combined with addr2line to resolve the calls to lines of code.
No It's not possible. Why don't you use gdb for this purpose?
When you are compiling application with gcc use -ggdb flags to get debugger info into your program and then run your program with gdb or equivalent frontend (ddd or similar)
Here is quick gdb manual to help you out a bit.
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~gilpin/tutorial/
You can use strace-plus that can collects stack traces associated with each system call.
http://code.google.com/p/strace-plus/
Pretty old question, but I found a way to accomplish what OP wanted:
First use strace with -k option, which will generate a stack trace like this:
openat(AT_FDCWD, NULL, O_RDONLY) = -1 EFAULT (Bad address)
> /usr/lib/libc-2.33.so(__open64+0x5b) [0xefeab]
> /usr/lib/libc-2.33.so(_IO_file_open+0x26) [0x816f6]
> /usr/lib/libc-2.33.so(_IO_file_fopen+0x10a) [0x818ca]
> /usr/lib/libc-2.33.so(__fopen_internal+0x7d) [0x7527d]
> /mnt/r/build/tests/main(main+0x90) [0x1330]
> /usr/lib/libc-2.33.so(__libc_start_main+0xd5) [0x27b25]
> /mnt/r/build/tests/main(_start+0x2e) [0x114e]
The address of each function call are displayed at the end of each line, and you can paste it to addr2line to retrieve the file and line. For example, we want to locate the call in main() (fifth line of the stack trace).
addr2line -e tests/main 0x1330
It will show something like this:
/mnt/r/main.c:55