Real examples of SQL injection issues for SQL Server using only a Replace as prevention? - sql-server

I know that dynamic SQL queries are bad due to the SQL Injection issues (as well as performance and other issues). I also know that parameterized queries are prefered to avoid injection issues, we all know that.
But my client is still very stubborn and thinks that just
var UserName=Request.Form["UserName"];
UserName=UserName.Replace("'","''");
SQL="SELECT * FROM Users where UserName='" + UserName + "'";
Is enought protection against SQL injection issues against (SQL Server (Only), not mysql).
Can anyone give me real SQL Injection attack example that still can get through the Replace case above? Guess there's some unicode character issues?
I want some real live examples of attacks that still can get through that simple replace.
My question is only for SQL Server and I know that MySQL has some issues with the \ character.

This will not work if you are using NUMBERs.
"SELECT * FROM data WHERE id = " + a_variable + ";"
using
1;DROP TABLE users
Gives you
SELECT * FROM DATA WHERE id=1;DROP TABLE users;
Have a look at
SQL injection
MSDN SQL Injection
EDIT
Have a look at this. It is very close to your question
Proving SQL Injection

Please input your age : 21; drop table users;
SELECT * FROM table where age = 21; drop table users;
ouchies

I have some trouble understanding the scope of replacement. Your original line is:
SQL=SQL.Replace("''","'");
Because you apply it to the variable name SQL, I would assume you are replacing all occurrences of '' with ' in the entire statement.
This can't be correct: consider this statement:
SELECT * FROM tab WHERE col = '<input value goes here>'
Now, if is the empty string, the statement will be:
SELECT * FROM tab WHERE col = ''
...and after SQL.Replace("''", "'") it will become:
SELECT * FROM tab WHERE col = '
As you can see, it will leave a dangling single quote, and yields a syntax error.
Now, let's suppose you intended to write SQL.Replace("'", "''") then the replaced statement would become:
SELECT * FROM tab WHERE col = ''''
Although syntactically correct, you are now comparing col to a literal single quote (as the '' inside the outer single quotes that delimit the literal string will evaluate to a literal single quote). So this can't be right either.
This leads me to believe that you might be doing something like this:
SQL = "SELECT * FROM tab WHERE col = '" & ParamValue.Replace("'", "''") & "'"
Now, as was already pointed out by the previous poster, this approach does not work for number. Or actually, this approach is only applicable in case you want to process the input inside a string literal in the SQL stament.
There is at least on case where this may be problematic. If MS SQL servers QUOTED_IDENTIFIER setting is disabled, then literal strings may also be enclosed by double quote characters. In this case, user values injecting a double quote will lead to the same problems as you have with single quote strings. In addition, the standard escape sequence for a single quote (two single quotes) doesn't work anymore!!
Just consider this snippet:
SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER OFF
SELECT " "" '' "
This gives the result:
" ''
So at least, the escaping process must be different depending on whether you delimit strings with single or with double quotes. This may not seem a big problem as QUOTED_IDENTIFIER is ON by default, but still. See:
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms174393.aspx

Please see this XKCD cartoon:
Little Bobby Tables

The answers so far have been targeting on condition query with numeric datatypes and not having single quote in the WHERE clause.
However in MSSQL *at least in ver 2005), this works even if id is say an integer type:
"SELECT * FROM data WHERE id = '" + a_variable + "';"
I hate to say this but unless stored procedure (code that calls EXECUTE, EXEC, or sp_executesql) is used or WHERE clauses do not use quotes for numeric types, using single quote replacement will almost prevent possibility of SQL Injection. I cannot be 100% certain, and I really hope someone can prove me wrong.
I mentioned stored procedure due to second level injection which I only recently read about. See an SO post here on What is second level SQL Injection.

To quote from the accepted answer of the SO question "Proving SQL Injection":
[...] there is nothing inherently unsafe in a properly-quoted SQL statement.
So, if
String data is properly escaped using Replace("'","''") (and your SQL uses single quotes around strings, see Roland's answer w.r.t. QUOTED_IDENTIFIER),
numeric data comes from numeric variables and is properly (i.e. culture-invariantly) converted to string, and
datetime data comes from datetime variables and is properly converted to string (i.e. into one of the culture-invariant formats accepted by SQL Server).
then I cannot think of any way that SQL injection could be done in SQL Server.
The Unicode thing you mentioned in your question was a MySQL bug. Accounting for such problems in your code provides an extra layer of security (which is usually a good thing). Primarily, it's the task of the database engine to make sure that a properly-quoted SQL statement is not a security risk.

Your client is correct.
SQL = SQL.Replace("'","''");
will stop all injection attacks.
The reason this is not considered safe is that it's easy to miss one string entirely.

Related

How to get rid of the default single quotes in parameterized queries in clickhouse

Consider this simple program:
from clickhouse_driver import Client
c = Client(host="localhost")
params = {"database": "test", "table": "t"}
query = c.substitute_params( query='SELECT * from %(database)s.%(table)s', params= params, context=c.connection.context)
print(query)
Clickhouse will put single quotes around the parameters, so the query result will be:
SELECT * from 'test'.'t'
I could also use f-string and the problem will be solved but that's vulnerable to SQLI. If I understand correctly, this is how parameterized queries are used in clickhouse to prevent SQLI.
How can we prevent the quotes from being put around the parameters?
As I understand it, substitute_params is not intended for database object identifiers like database and table, since those have to be quoted "differently" in ClickHouse (generally with backticks) than actual literal string values (with single quotes). https://clickhouse.com/docs/en/sql-reference/syntax/#identifiers
In general you can do your own bit of "SQL Injection defense" by validating the inputs for database and table, like ensuring they match a simple regex like "are all lower case letters or underscore" that applies to your ClickHouse schema. In that case using an f-string should be safe.
ClickHouse also support "server side substitution" where you can use an Identifier type for this use case, but I don't believe that feature is available in clickhouse-driver.

How safe is T-SQL after you replace the ' escape character?

I am fully aware that the correct practice for sanitising SQL queries is to parameterise them.
I work on a lot of pre-existing code where the sanitisation measure was to replace all instaces of ' with '' in dynamic strings. I am trying to figure out how concerned I should be.
Here's the thing: this code runs exclusively on T-SQL (SQL Server 2008R2 and higher) and, as far as I can tell, ' is the only escape character for T-SQL.
So, how would you execute an injection attack to get past the above measure? I.e. is that very "naïve" sanitisation actually pretty solid on T-SQL, as it looks like?
Yes, a single-quote is the only escape character so you are mostly, but not entirely ok.
Using parameters, while best, is mostly just doing the ' to '' replacement that you are doing manually. BUT, they also enforce a maximum string length. Of course, if we were talking about non-string parameters, they would have the benefit of enforcing the type of the data (i.e. a ' does not need to be escaped for numeric, date/time, etc types as it is not valid for them to begin with).
The issue you might still be left with is a subset of SQL Injection called SQL Truncation. The idea is to force some part of the dynamic sql off the end of the string. I am not sure how likely this is to happen in practice, but, depending on how and where you are constructing the dynamic sql, you need to make sure that the variable holding the dynamic SQL to execute is large enough to hold the static pieces in your code plus all of the variables assuming they are submitted at their maximum lengths.
Here is an article from MSDN Magazine, New SQL Truncation Attacks And How To Avoid Them, that shows both regular SQL Injection as well as SQL Truncation. You will see in the article that to avoid SQL Injection they mostly just do the REPLACE(#variable, '''', '''''') method, but also show using QUOTENAME(#variable, '[') for some situations.
EDIT (2015-01-20): Here is a good resource, though not specific to SQL Server, that details various types of SQL Injection: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_SQL_Injection_(OTG-INPVAL-005)
The following article is related to the one above. This one is specific to SQL Server, but more general in terms of overall security. There are sections related to SQL Injection:
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_SQL_Server
(Insert remarks about dangers of broken sanitization and escaping here. See comment of marc_s.)
What you propose here is the same method that the Microsoft SQL Server Managed Objects (SMO) use. Those are .NET DLLs that one can inspect using a decompiler. For example:
internal static string MakeSqlString(string value)
{
StringBuilder builder = new StringBuilder();
builder.Append("N'");
builder.Append(EscapeString(value, '\''));
builder.Append("'");
return builder.ToString();
}
public static string EscapeString(string value, char escapeCharacter)
{
StringBuilder builder = new StringBuilder();
foreach (char ch in value)
{
builder.Append(ch);
if (escapeCharacter == ch)
{
builder.Append(ch);
}
}
return builder.ToString();
}
So yes, simply doing a Replace("'", "''") is enough according to Microsoft. I'm sure this is not just intern code but has been audited for security. They always do this due to the SDL.
Note also that this code seems to be made to work with Unicode (see the N prefix). Apparently, this is Unicode-safe as well.
On a more subjective note: I do escape T-SQL string literals just like this if I have to. I trust this method.
This is in .NET
I now notice the question is tagged TSQL but not .NET
Marc implied you could fool it with the unicode or hex representation.
I tested and neither unicode nor hex fooled it in .NET.
As for fooling it with a proper number of apostrophe.
If you are always replacing one with two I don't see how a proper number could fool it.
u0027 and x0027 is apostrophe and it was replaced with two apostrophe
2018 and 2019 are left and right quotes and SQL just treated them as literals
string badString = "sql inject \' bad stuff here hex \x0027 other bad stuff unicode \u0027 other bad stuff left \u2018 other bad stuff right \u2019 other bad stuff";
System.Diagnostics.Debug.WriteLine(badString);
System.Diagnostics.Debug.WriteLine(SQLclean(badString));
}
public string SQLclean(string s)
{
string cleanString = s.Replace("\'", "\'\'");
return "N\'" + cleanString + "\'";
}
I think parameters is a better practice

How do I do quotes within quotes in TSQL

I have a case statement that will set a varchar variable #stored_proc_name to the name of a procedure that I want to call later on. One of the procedures I want to call takes a varchar as an argument (and also an int). How do I do this? Currently what I have is this
SELECT #stored_proc_name = CASE #p_process_name
WHEN 'misdate' THEN 'findb..sp_cycle_date_daily'
WHEN 'balpremmis' THEN 'findb..pc_bal_writ_prem'
WHEN 'ursctl' THEN 'MIS_feeds..pc_mis_update_feed_control "URSPO", 1'
ELSE NULL
END
EXECUTE #stored_proc_name
The last one is my procedure that takes arguments, where "URSPO" should be the first, and 1 is the int. It is running on SQL server 2k8 (I think I remember some difference with single vs. double quotes between this and older versions). Is what I have correct? I admit that I haven't tested it yet, but it is a part of a huge process that I really don't want to kick off right now.
Thank for any help!
To escape a single quote inside a string literal, use a double quote like below. See the Constants section in the BOL for more information:
select ' '' ' -- creates a string containing a space, a single quote, and another space
In your example, this would be the string:
'MIS_feeds..pc_mis_update_feed_control ''URSPO'', 1'
If you were going to use this string in a LIKE expression, you might want to refer to this question.
And if you were going to build a string to be a SQL identifier, you might want to escape it using the QUOTENAME function.
You can use the code below:
set quoted_identifier off;
Select "'Hi'"
quoted_identifiere will enable you to use ", instead of ';

Is it possible to concat strings in SOQL?

I've read thread from 2005 and people said SOQL does not support string concatenation.
Though wondering if it is supported and someone has done this.
I'm trying to concat but no luck :(
Below is APEX code trying to find record with specified email.
String myEmail = 'my#email.com';
String foo = 'SELECT emailTo__c, source__c FROM EmailLog__c
WHERE source__c = \'' +
myEmail + '\';
Database.query(foo)
Even though the record is indeed in the database, it does not query anything. Debug shows
"row(0)" which means empty is returned.
Am I doing concat wrong way?
UPDATE
I just found a way not have to add single quote. Just needed to apply same colon variable even for String that has query.
String foo = DateTime.newInstance(......);
String bar = 'SELECT id FROM SomeObject__c WHERE createdOn__c = :foo';
List<SomeObject__c> result = Database.query(bar);
System.debug(result);
This works too and is necessary if WHERE clause contains DateTime since DateTime cannot be surrounded with single quotes.
Why do you use Database.query()? Stuff will be much simpler and faster if you'll use normal queries in brackets
[SELECT emailTo__c, source__c FROM EmailLog__c WHERE source__c = :myEmail]
Not to mention that parameter binding instead of string concatenation means no need to worry about SQL injections etc.. Please consider getting used to these queries in brackets, they look weird in beginnign but will save your butt many times (mistyped field names etc).
As for actual concatenation - it works like you described it, I'm just unsure about the need to escape apostrophes. Binding the variables is safest way to go.
http://www.salesforce.com/us/developer/docs/apexcode/Content/apex_dynamic_soql.htm
http://www.salesforce.com/us/developer/docs/api/index_Left.htm#CSHID=sforce_api_calls_soql.htm|StartTopic=Content%2Fsforce_api_calls_soql.htm|SkinName=webhelp

Is this sufficient to prevent query injection while using SQL Server?

I have recently taken on a project in which I need to integrate with PHP/SQL Server. I am looking for the quickest and easiest function to prevent SQL injection on SQL Server as I prefer MySQL and do not anticipate many more SQL Server related projects.
Is this function sufficient?
$someVal = mssql_escape($_POST['someVal']);
$query = "INSERT INTO tblName SET field = $someVal";
mssql_execute($query);
function mssql_escape($str) {
return str_replace("'", "''", $str);
}
If not, what additional steps should I take?
EDIT:
I am running on a Linux server - sqlsrv_query() only works if your hosting environment is windows
The best option: do not use SQL statements that get concatenated together - use parametrized queries.
E.g. do not create something like
string stmt = "INSERT INTO dbo.MyTable(field1,field2) VALUES(" + value1 + ", " + value2 + ")"
or something like that and then try to "sanitize" it by replacing single quotes or something - you'll never catch everything, someone will always find a way around your "safe guarding".
Instead, use:
string stmt = "INSERT INTO dbo.MyTable(field1,field2) VALUES(#value1, #value2)";
and then set the parameter values before executing this INSERT statement. This is really the only reliable way to avoid SQL injection - use it!
UPDATE: how to use parametrized queries from PHP - I found something here - does that help at all?
$tsql = "INSERT INTO DateTimeTable (myDate, myTime,
myDateTimeOffset, myDatetime2)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)";
$params = array(
date("Y-m-d"), // Current date in Y-m-d format.
"15:30:41.987", // Time as a string.
date("c"), // Current date in ISO 8601 format.
date("Y-m-d H:i:s.u") // Current date and time.
);
$stmt = sqlsrv_query($conn, $tsql, $params);
So it seems you can't use "named" parameters like #value1, #value2, but instead you just use question marks ? for each parameter, and you basically just create a parameter array which you then pass into the query.
This article Accessing SQL Server Databases with PHP might also help - it has a similar sample of how to insert data using the parametrized queries.
UPDATE: after you've revealed that you're on Linux, this approach doesn't work anymore. Instead, you need to use an alternate library in PHP to call a database - something like PDO.
PDO should work both on any *nix type operating system, and against all sorts of databases, including SQL Server, and it supports parametrized queries, too:
$db = new PDO('your-connection-string-here');
$stmt = $db->prepare("SELECT priv FROM testUsers WHERE username=:username AND password=:password");
$stmt->bindParam(':username', $user);
$stmt->bindParam(':password', $pass);
$stmt->execute();
No, it's not sufficient. To my knowledge, string replacement can never really be sufficient in general (on any platform).
To prevent SQL injection, all queries need to be parameterized - either as parameterized queries or as stored procedures with parameters.
In these cases, the database calling library (i.e. ADO.NET and SQL Command) sends the parameters separately from the query and the server applies them, which eliminates the ability for the actual SQL to be altered in any way. This has numerous benefits besides injection, which include code page issues and date conversion issues - for that matter any conversions to string can be problematic if the server does not expect them done the way the client does them.
I partially disagree with other posters. If you run all your parameters through a function that double the quotes, this should prevent any possible injection attack. Actually in practice the more frequent problem is not deliberate sabotague but queries that break because a value legitimately includes a single quote, like a customer named "O'Hara" or a comment field of "Don't call Sally before 9:00". Anyway, I do escapes like this all the time and have never had a problem.
One caveat: On some database engines, there could be other dangerous characters besides a single quote. The only example I know is Postgres, where the backslash is magic. In this case your escape function must also double backslashes. Check the documentation.
I have nothing against using prepared statements, and for simple cases, where the only thing that changes is the value of the parameter, they are an excellent solution. But I routinely find that I have to build queries in pieces based on conditions in the program, like if parameter X is not null then not only do I need to add it to the where clause but I also need an additional join to get to the value I really need to test. Prepared statements can't handle this. You could, of course, build the SQL in pieces, turn it into a prepared statement, and then supply the parameters. But this is just a pain for no clear gain.
These days I mostly code in Java that allows functions to be overloaded, that is, have multiple implementations depending on the type of the passed in parameter. So I routine write a set of functions that I normally name simply "q" for "quote", that return the given type, suitably quoted. For strings, it doubles any quote marks, then slaps quote marks around the whole thing. For integers it just returns the string representation of the integer. For dates it converts to the JDBC (Java SQL) standard date format, which the driver is then supposed to convert to whatever is needed for the specific database being used. Etc. (On my current project I even included array as a passed in type, which I convert to a format suitable for use in an IN clause.) Then every time I want to include a field in a SQL statement, I just write "q(x)". As this is slapping quotes on when necessary, I don't need the extra string manipulation to put on quotes, so it's probably just as easy as not doing the escape.
For example, vulnerable way:
String myquery="select name from customer where customercode='"+custcode+"'";
Safe way:
String myquery="select name from customer where customercode="+q(custcode);
The right way is not particularly more to type than the wrong way, so it's easy to get in a good habit.
String replacement to escape quotes IS sufficient to prevent SQL injection attack vectors.
This only applies to SQL Server when QUOTED_IDENTIFIER is ON, and when you don't do something stoopid to your escaped string, such as truncating it or translating your Unicode string to an 8-bit string after escaping. In particular, you need to make sure QUOTED_IDENTIFIER is set to ON. Usually that's the default, but it may depend on the library you are using in PHP to access MSSQL.
Parameterization is a best practice, but there is nothing inherently insecure about escaping quotes to prevent SQL injection, with due care.
The rel issue with escaping strings is not the efficacy of the replacement, it is the potential for forgetting to do the replacement every time.
That said, your code escapes the value, but does not wrap the value in quotes. You need something like this instead:
function mssql_escape($str) {
return "N'" + str_replace("'", "''", $str) + "'";
}
The N above allows you to pass higher Unicode characters. If that's not a concern (i.e., your text fields are varchar rather than nvarchar), you can remove the N.
Now, if you do this, there are some caveats:
You need to make DAMNED SURE you call mssql_escape for every string value. And therein lies the rub.
Dates and GUID values also need escaping in the same manner.
You should validate numeric values, or at least escape them as well using the same function (MSSQL will cast the string to the appropriate numeric type).
Again, like others have said, parameterized queries are safer--not because escaping quotes doesn't work (it does except as noted above), but because it's easier to visually make sure you didn't forget to escape something.

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