I have my snowflake warehouse hosted on an address that looks like this :
*********.snowflakecomputing.com/console (not sure where it is hosted - maybe within the Snowflake cloud). However, I do not have it configured to go through a VPN connection. Is there a way to require that console access is only through VPN?
I think you are asking about Network Policies.
Nit: I am not sure "insecure" is the right word to use. All data is transferred over HTTPS and is therefore encrypted. Using SAML you can use your own authentication provider and use MFA. Thus you can easily match the highest standards of security in the industry.
Yes, you can restrict access to your snowflake account using an account-level network policy.
You can define VPN IP(s) in the allowed IP list in the account level network policy and activate the policy.
After account level activation, everyone is required to connect the VPN before accessing the snowflake account.
Details: https://docs.snowflake.com/en/user-guide/network-policies.html#managing-account-level-network-policies
Related
I understand that the principle of Kerberos is to allow authentication between users and services on an unsecured network. Tickets generated by the authentication and ticket-granting service support secure communications and don't require a password to be transmitted across the network.
The flow relies on the auth server in the KDC (s) having a shared secret with the client (c).
However, at some point, the user itself must have been created and generally, users are created from client machines (you don't usually log onto the domain controller to create users)
So how do the user and secret key (Kac) get created in the first place and stored in the KDC database if the password/secret is never sent across the network?
The administration of principals in a KDC's database is outside the scope of the normal Kerberos protocol. Usually it's done using some auxiliary protocol, and each KDC can implement it in any way it wants.
For example, MIT Kerberos has the (SunRPC-based) kadmin protocol, and the kadmin client indeed sends the actual administrator-specified password to the kadmind service running on the KDC. (The RPC message is encrypted using the Kerberos session key, of course.) Heimdal has its own kadmin protocol, mostly incompatible with MIT's but working the same way.
(Both also have "local" versions of the kadmin tool, which directly accesses the KDC database backend – this is how the initial admin accounts are created, typically by running kadmin.local on the server console or through SSH.)
Microsoft Active Directory has several user administration protocols, some of them dating to pre-AD days, but the primary mechanism is LDAP (usually over an GSSAPI/Kerberos-encrypted session, but occassionally TLS-encrypted).
To create a new account in MS AD, the administrator creates an LDAP 'User' or 'Computer' entry with the plain-text 'userPassword' attribute, and the domain controller automatically transforms this attribute into Kerberos keys (instead of storing it raw). The commonly used "AD Users & Computers" applet (dsa.msc) is really an interface to the LDAP directory.
All of the above implementations also support a second administration protocol, the kpasswd protocol whose sole purpose is to allow an existing user to change their password. As you'd expect, it also works by transmitting the user's new password over the network, again making use of Kerberos authentication and encryption. (Password changes can also be done via AD's LDAP or MIT/Heimdal's kadmin, but kpasswd has the advantage of being supported by all three.)
As a final side note, the PKINIT extension uses X.509 certificates to authenticate the AS-REQ – in which case the client doesn't know their own shared secret, so the KDC in fact sends the whole Kc to the client over the network (encrypted using a session key negotiated via DH, somewhat like TLS would). This is mostly used in Active Directory environments with "smart card" authentication.
Is there a way to detect and monitor that a service principal is only being used from a specific set of IP addresses? I do not want to IP restrict my entire directory. I have premium AAD and I think it has features that I might be able to utilized but I cannot do much testing. I’m currently struggling on how to detect if a SP has been jeopardized and how to prevent it.
If you want to use IP as conditions for the user to sign-in, you could use Conditional Access to make it. But the Conditional Access is used for the entire tenant.
And the features of Azure Active Directory Premium includes:
Company branding
Group-based application access
Self-service password reset
Self-service group management
Advanced security reports and alerts
Multi-Factor Authentication
Forefront Identity Manager (FIM)
Enterprise SLA of 99.9%
For the details, please read here.
We have one domain with trust (not-transitive) to two other domains. The base domain user can login without any problems, but the users from other domains cannot.
We get exception from ADFS like this:
The Federation Service encountered an error during an attempt to
connect to a LDAP server at {trusted domain}.
Additional Data Domain Name: {trusted domain} LDAP server hostname:
{trusted domain dc} Error from LDAP server: Exception Details: A
local error occurred.
User Action Check the network connectivity to the LDAP server. Also,
check whether the LDAP server is configured properly.
After reserching we found out, it's the one-way trust problem. The problem is, we don't have any posibility to change the trust configuration or to set up other ADFS on trusted domains.
Is there some possibility to get it to work? Maybe some work around solution?
Is it possible to change the FormSignin page, search the user manualy with DirectoryServices and manualy create the token?
Thanks All!
Not sure if there's a way to do it if you keep your ADFS service account in the trusting domain (in a one-way trust scenario). You would need to allow that account to be able to query LDAP in the trusted domain, which would usually mean a two-way trust.
Absent that, you may try to setup use an ADFS service account from the trusted domain. Of course, this would only work for one of your domains (unless the two other domains have trusts between themselves).
I've read how IBM's WebSphere can propagate the identity of a user back to a backend database (http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/websphere/techjournal/0506_barghouthi/0506_barghouthi.html). Does JBoss have similar functionality? Ideally, I'd like to be able to login to my JBoss application using SPNEGO and propagate that identity back to a PostgreSQL database using Kerberos or some other mechanism. Is this possible?
The article you've linked to could be used for that, but there are some caveats.
Having the app server re-authenticate as different users using Kerberos is probably not realistic. From my knowledge of Kerberos (admittedly limited), it is designed so that end-user interaction is required to do an actual authentication handshake. The user does the handshake with the app server over HTTP-- there isn't really a mechanism for asking them to re-authenticate with the DB itself.
You could use their hooks to issue "SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION TO ..." commands to PostgreSQL, though, if your app server performs its connections to the DB as a superuser. That doesn't actually re-authenticate, just changes the session authorisation role temporarily.
You could also use one of the myriad "store some session information in the DB" solutions (custom variables, PL/Perl etc global variables) and use their hooks to work with that. This is actually what their Oracle solution seems to do, it sets the client identifier which iirc is just a global variable in dbms_util somewhere that is included in views showing current sessions (and postgresql 9.0 has an "application name" that performs the same role)
Typical ISP setup. One server is the web server, another is the DB SQL server. There is a local administrator account, let's say XYZ, created on both machines. So when I log in remotely, I am either WebServer\XYZ or DBServer\XYZ, depending where I log in.
Now, when I login to SQL Server SSMS on DBServer using Windows Authentication, and execute "SELECT SUSER_NAME()", I get DBServer\XYZ. That makes sense since it's picking up the fact that I logged in with those credentials.
Now, move over to the WebServer. I remotely login as WebServer\XYZ. I've installed the SQL client components there. When I launch SSMS, choose the DBServer, login with Windows Authentication, and execute "SELECT SUSER_NAME()", I somehow get DBSERVER\XYZ, instead of what I would assume should be WebServer\XYZ.
Somehow, the XYZ from the WebServer becomes the XYZ from the DBServer. Why is that? How does that happen? Surely, it can't just be because the names happen to be the same?
I've heard of trusted domains, but neither machine is a Domain Controller, so I don't have access to that info. How can I tell if it's trusted or not, without the GUI tools?
The reason I ask the question is because, I'm trying to implement the same thing on my XP laptop (using Virtual PC), so I can imitate the production environment, but I'm not having any luck.
The NTLM challenge between machines is a little more complex #Quassnoi indicates but it is similar. The machines may well be in the same domain or trusted domains, but the accounts you are using are local machine accounts, scoped only to the local machine's security access management.
Local SAM accounts patterned as machinename\userid are non-propagatable. You'd experience a series of negotiated fallbacks when you tried to authenticate against external resources using that account as follows:
Pass current domain/username/password hash token - it'll fail, the account is untrusted
Fallback - revert passing hash of UserID + Password
Fallback - revert to connecting as anonymous credentials.
The fallbacks can also be disabled through configuration, it is very common for anonymous authentication to be prevented.
As #Quassnoi indicates in this instance you managed to login using the #2 fallback.
To enable account credentials to propagate, you'd need the following to be true:
machines would need to be members of domains with at least one-way trust between each other (they don't necessarily have to be members of the same domain).
use domain accounts - not local machine accounts - would look something like domainname\userid. A special case is the Network Service account which has a proxy account in the domain scenario - domainname\machinename$.
How do you tell if your machine is a member of the domain? It's pretty easy if you've got interactive login to the machines. There are a few strategies
interactively the System control panel will show workgroup or domain membership. (Right-click properties on Computer in the start menu)
at the command-line, IPCONFIG /ALL will also show the default DNS prefix which is typically the same as your domain name.
I suspect your ISP would create a domain just to make it easy to manage and monitor their machines. Whether they'd let you create domain accounts is a different question.
You XYZ accounts seem to have same passwords on both machines, and they are not a part of a domain.
WebServer sends just XYZ as a username and answers all password challenges successfuly, as the passwords do match.
DbServer, of course, thinks of you as of DbServer/XYZ, as it knows of no others.
Exactly same thing happens when you try to access one standalone machine from another one over SMB. If your usernames and password match, you succeed.